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ARTICLES
CONTRACT COMPENSATION IN NONMARKET
TRANSACTIONSt
Joseph P. Tomain *
Professor Tomain assails the myths holding that contract law is either complete and
unitary or hopelessly indeterminate. He contends that a distinction must be made between
market situations, which require a more formal analysis, and nonmarket transactions to
which a more particularized analysis should be applied. Making the market/nonmarket dis-
tinction permits flexibility of methodology and considerations of economics, politics, and
morals as appropriate, without forcing the conclusion that contracts analysis is totally without
structure. Professor Tomain advocates application of reflective doctrinal analysis which tests
the sufficiency of a rule of law and reforms the rule if it is not supported by sound policies
The analysis should relate form to content by recognizing that contract rules are dictated by
contract types. He demonstrates that consistent workable decisional rules can be developed,
even for nonmarket transactions, by keying in on the subject matter of the contract. Professor
Tomain fully illustrates how the market/nonmarket distinction and reflective doctrinal anal-
ysis are employed to examine and, when necessary, reform rules of contract law by analyzing
the issue whether a promisee should be afforded relieffor nonpecuniary harm resulting from
a promisor's breach in a nonmarket transaction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Myth is not defined by the object of its message, but by the way in which
it utters this message: there are formal limits to myth, there are no 'sub-
stantial' ones. Everything, then, can be a myth? Yes, I believe this, for
the universe is infinitely fertile in suggestions.
Roland Barthes, Mythologies'
Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning,
law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in
which we live.
Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreward: Nomos and Narrative2
This Article is about myth, meaning, and method in the law of
contracts. The discussion of these interrelated phenomena is a practi-
cal exercise in legal analysis treating contracts law as more alive than
dead and more meaningful than meaningless. The discussion also
serves as an antidote to the excesses of current jurisprudence which
assaults contracts from the ideological left and right and sometimes
claims contracts for the center.
The primary assertion of modem contracts jurisprudence is that
contract law is in intellectual or theoretical disarray. 3 As evidence for
their claim about fragmentation, proponents point to conflicts among
1. R. BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 109 (Hill & Wang eds. 1972).
2. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 4, 4-5 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 898, 898 (1983) ("Students of contract law agree on two points-that contract law is central to
our legal and social systems and that it is currently in intellectual disarray."); Eisenberg, The Bar-
gain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741-42 (1982); C. FRIED, CONTRACT LAW AS
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2-3 (1981).
I have adopted a particular word usage in the Introduction and Section II. I refer to contract(s)
in the singular and plural. In the remainder of the Article the reference is to "contracts." See infra
note 24 and accompanying text, for an explanation of this linguistic device.
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competing theories which base contract law on economics, 4 politics, 5
or morals. 6 It should be obvious, although we quickly lose sight of
this, that interdisciplinary categorical statements about the whole of
contracts law are partisan; there is no one way to analyze contracts
law, and the norms contained in the categories can and do conflict. A
breach may be efficient while unfair and may be politically acceptable
at the same time, for example. A conflict between efficiency and eq-
uity together with the seemingly contradictory statement that the con-
flict is acceptable politically does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that contracts law is hopelessly uncertain or meaningless.
I argue, instead, that through doctrinal analysis sense can be made
from contracts law, that conflicts among competing categories can be
usefully mediated, and that modem discourse, even with its apparent
contradictions, has enhanced rather than disturbed the soundness of
contracts law.
Despite claims of disarray, modem discourse has made two im-
portant contributions to understanding and doing contracts. The first
contribution is formal. The modem mode influences how we think
and talk about contracts. The second contribution is substantive. Ec-
4. See, eg., A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979); R.
POSNER, ECONOMICS OF LAW ch. 4 (2d ed. 1977); M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS chs. 5 & 8 (1983); Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1980); J. Pennock & J.
Chapman (eds.) ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW (Nomos XXIV 1982). A lengthy bibliography
of economic analyses of contracts law appears in C. GOETz, LAW AND ECONOMICS 523-28 (1983).
Citations to more specific references appear throughout the Article.
5. See, ag., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 616-48 (1983);
Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302 (1977) (reviewing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977)); Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method
for Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Gabel, Intention and
Structure]; Gabel & Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRES-
SIVE CRITIQUE 172 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA
L. REV. 829 (1983); Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology (Book Review), 33 STAN. L. REV. 753
(1981) (reviewing P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)); Klare,
Contracts Jurisprudence and the First-Year Casebook (Book Review), 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1979)
(reviewing C. KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1976)); M.
HORoWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 ch. VI (1977). More specific
citations appear throughout.
6. See C. FRIED, supra note 3; P. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW (1981); Johnson,
The Idea of Autonomy and the Foundations ofContractual Liability, 2 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 271
(1983); Ardal, Ought We to Keep Contracts Because They are Promises?, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 655
(1983); Fridman, On the Nature of Contracts, 17 VAL. U.L. REV. 627 (1983); Raz, Promises in
Morality and Law (Book Review), 95 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1982) (reviewing P. ATiYAH, PROMISES.
MORALS, AND LAW (1981)).
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onomics, politics, and moral philosophy provide substantive bases for
policy analysis and supply normative justifications for contracts rules.
We can assume the truth of Barthes' statement that everything
can be myth without believing all myth is meaningless. As applied to
law, we can recognize the artificiality of legal constructs without be-
lieving contracts law or contracts methods are either indeterminate
nonsense or motivated by a single moral, economic, or political crite-
rion. Myth is grounded in reality. Uncovering the layers of meaning
contained in the myth and then reconstructing its story leads to an
understanding of the meaning of the myth, the possibilities of law,
and, after Cover, the world in which we live. We uncover the mean-
ing of the myth through method. The method used here, called reflec-
tive doctrinal analysis, has been given its shape by modem discourse.
Part II briefly defines the concepts of myth, meaning, and
method. These are neither exhaustive nor controversial descriptions.
They are necessary, however, to show how doctrinal analysis has de-
veloped and to place the remaining discussion into a broader, more
understandable context. Part II also presents the theoretical back-
ground for the discussion of a specific contracts rule. The rule, as
stated in section 353 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, is a
presumption against awarding contract damages for nonpecuniary in-
juries suffered as a result of a breach of contract. Part III employs the
described method and first analyzes the liability basis of the rule. Part
III then describes the pathology of the rule, indicates how and why
the rule has broken down, and states that the rule is not defensible
and should be replaced by eliminating the presumption against a right
to such awards. Part IV examines the remedial basis of an alternative
rule and argues that a damages remedy can be fashioned consonant
with the rationale behind granting a right for nonpecuniary harms.
Consistent with the description of the contributions of modem dis-
course, the analysis in Part III is supported by policy arguments
drawn from economics, politics, and morals. The substantive concep-
tual vehicle in which the analysis travels is a distinction between mar-
ket and nonmarket transactions. 7 There are a variety of contractual
7. The market/nonmarket distinction runs through much, if not all, contracts talk. See, e.g.,
Unger, supra note 5, at 618-25. In that article, Unger refers to the market/nonmarket distinction
throughout his discussion of contracts law, but nowhere more eloquently than in the following
passage:
The idea that there is an area of experience outside the serious world of work, in which
communal relations flourish, can be made to justify the devolution of practical life to the
harshest self-interest. The premises to this devolution recall the contrast between Venice
[Vol. 46:867
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situations and relationships which cannot be justified or defended
with market-based rationales. While economics can be used to justify
market transactions, nonmarket transactions are better supported by
moral norms. Both sets of norms coexist in a political climate com-
mitted to mediating conflicts between the two sets of values. Finally,
the conclusion suggests broader applications for the market/
nonmarket distinction.
II. MYTH, MEANING, AND METHOD IN MODERN CONTRACTS
LAW
A. The Interdisciplinary Form of Modern Discourse
Before the concepts of myth, meaning, and method are amplified,
the structure of modem discourse must be recognized because it is
this structure which gives the appearance of disarray and, once under-
stood, helps to unravel the jumbled strands of contractual analyses.
The form of modem discourse is: "Contract law is based on. .. ."
In the blank fill in economics, politics, or moral philosophy. Indeed,
we can say that the battle for the normative soul of contracts is fought
on these three fronts with incidental skirmishes every now and then.8
and Belmont in The Merchant of Venice. In Venice people make contracts; in Belmont
they exchange weddings rings. In Venice they are held together by combinations of inter-
est; in Belmont by mutual affection. The wealth and power of Venice depend upon the
willingness of its courts to hold men to their contracts. The charm of Belmont is to pro-
vide its inhabitants with a community in which contracts remain for the most part super-
fluous. Venice is tolerable because its citizens can flee occasionally to Belmont and appeal
from Venetian justice to Belmontine mercy. But the very existence of Belmont presupposes
the prosperity of Venice, from which the denizens of Belmont gain their means of liveli-
hood. This is the form of life classical contract theory claims to describe and seeks to
define-an existence separated into a sphere of trade supervised by the state and an area of
private family and friendship largely though not wholly beyond the reach of contract.
Each half of this life both denies the other and depends upon it. Each is at once the other's
partner and its enemy.
Id. at 622-23. See also Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. I & 2), 46
YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937). The seminal contribution of this pair of articles is the alignment of
the expectancy interest with market analysis and the reliance interest with nonmarket analysis.
8. Although contracts discourse is not limited to economics, politics, and morals, these are the
dominant modes of analysis used by most mainstream scholars. My authoritative support for this
assertion lies in the contracts casebooks by the law publishing houses of West, Foundation Press,
Michie Bobbs-Merrill, and Little, Brown & Co. Contracts can be examined within other disciplines,
e.g., historically, see M. HORowrrz, supra note 5; L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
228-247 (1973); L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); and P. ATIYAH, supra note 6;
anthropologically, Gabel, Intention and Structure, supra note 5; and, sociologically, see I. MACNEIL,
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980).
The forced alignment of contracts law with other disciplines is as artificial as separating law into
contracts and torts or contracts into "real" contracts and quasi-contracts. Categories are distin-
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This form of contracts talk is interdisciplinary. Interdisciplinary dis-
course has the following formal attributes which are more specifically
discussed in the remaining sections of this Part: generality,9 a princi-
pal substantive criterion,10 a principal analytic methodology, an ana-
lytic method normatively linked to a substantive criterion,1 and an
ideological agenda tilted in favor of the nonlegal discipline.12 The in-
terdisciplinary view is neither a completely inside nor outside look at
contracts. 13 That is to say, the primary goal of interdisciplinary dis-
guished for several reasons, one of which is to make discourse intelligible as opposed to affirming the
desirability and separability of categories. Categorization is a means to the end of intelligible and
practical discourse not an objectively verifiable truth. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
9. I have extrapolated the concept of generality from the following sources: L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW 46-49 (1964); R. UNGER, LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY 176-81 (1976); J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 23 (1971); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1687-90. These authors
write about generality as an element of a rule of law. Here the term "generality" is applied to an
entire body of substantive doctrine. See, e.g., Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PIr. L. REV. 1, 6-
10 (1983). Charles Fried calls this general approach an instrumental view of law. Fried, The Artifi-
cial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv. 35, 35-36 (1981).
10. See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text. But see S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND
CONFLICT 1 (1983); V. HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS 3-5 (1984). Both authors argue that single
criterion analysis of normative values is too restrictive and ultimately misleading.
11. Much of this Article is about what I mean by "normatively linked." I use the concept in
two senses. First, the external discipline that one chooses as a basis of analysis carries with it norma-
tive content. To speak about "Law and Sociology" necessarily means speaking about law from a
sociological (and reductionist) orientation. Second, form and content (method and substance) are
linked in ways that are reflexive and reinforcing. See infra Part II, Subsection D. See generally D.
HOFSTADTER, GOEDEL, ESCHER AND BACH 431-37 & ch. XVI (1980); R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 71-78 (1981). This normative link between substance and method as a necessary
limiting device is useful for understanding and knowledge. See, e.g., N. CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND
RESPONSIBILITY 64 (1977). The statement "Contracts law is x" means the proponent has commit-
ted herself or himself to making assertions about contracts constrained by x. I want to distinquish
this Article from that larger type of claim. Rather, this Article is an inside look at a specific rule of
contracts, and the rule is discussed with the reference to three sets of norms, economics, politics, and
morals. The link between content and method is forcefully developed by Kennedy, Legal Formality,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1701-24; and Feinman, Promissory Estoppel
and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678 (1984).
12. Grey, supra note 9, at 52: "The neo-orthodoxies drawn from economics and moral philos-
ophy resemble classical legal science in their capacity to promote structured puzzle-solving of a
sometimes interesting kind. But, in contrast to the classical theory, they dilute the autonomy of law
(and hence, potentially, the status of the profession) .... " See also Fried, supra note 9, which also
argues for law's disciplinary autonomy as an intellectual discipline.
13. The inside/outside dichotomy is a matter of perception. The scholar who asks "What is
the point of contracts law?" looks on the whole of the body of doctrine to place it in other contexts
such as into the whole of law or social theory or history as examples. The person who asks "How
can I make sense of contracts law?" examines law from the inside with a view to doing law (advising
clients or deciding cases). The insider's statement, "I want to make sense of contracts so that I can
do it," carries with it some not inconsequential attributes, chief among which are rationalism (make
sense) and pragmatism (do it). Naturally, a complete and sophisticated treatment of the topic
glances both inside and outside. Nevertheless, each viewpoint presents a different orientation and
[Vol. 46:867
NONMARKET TRANSACTIONS
course is not to do contracts. Rather, interdisciplinary discourse
makes a normative assertion about what contracts law "really" does
or ought to do, thus altering traditional doctrinal analysis. 14
Interdisciplinary discourse is distinguished from and illuminative
of contracts law. It is distinguishable because the principal objective
of the interdisciplinary approach is to promote a particular ideologi-
cal program 15 by criticizing all of contracts law, criticizing the whole
of law or the whole of legal method, or criticizing contemporary soci-
ety, or some combination of these. In order to accomplish these
broader goals, contracts law is discussed as a uniform, whole body of
doctrine. Interdisciplinary discourse thus stands in opposition to do-
ing and understanding how contracts law works from the inside. Still,
the approach is illuminating because interdisciplinary discourse forces
the question: What is the normative/ideological content of one's ana-
lytic method?
After admitting that different and potentially conflicting theoreti-
cal bases exist, contracts law must deal with the conflicts instead of
resting on the proposition that disarray is inevitable. The first stage is
to recognize the interdisciplinary form which has been done. The
next stage is to test whether the form can be used to do contracts and
mediate competing values.
Contracts analysis cannot accept the myth that contracts law is
or should be uniform. The element of generality upon which interdis-
ciplinary discourse is dependent must give way to accepting the diver-
sity of contract types. After the element of generality is loosened, the
form can be usefully applied. The interdisciplinary form is helpful but
not wholly successful because it fails to recognize contracts are not
uniform. Interdisciplinary discourse depends on discussing contracts
law generally because of its commitment to an ideological program.
Law and economics analysis, for example, intends to prove that law is
economic. When inconsistencies arise, they are disregarded as aberra-
tional or wrong. If generality is denied, that is, if we admit contracts
are not uniform, we will be lead to the conclusion that contracts law is
can lead to different conclusions. This Article is predominantly an inside look which means, at least
for the purposes of the arguments made here, that I accept the role of law in society and social
institutions. See Grey, supra note 9, at 6; P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 1-2, 38-51 (1984).
14. The method of analysis employed here is distinct from the more scientific goals attributed
to Langdellian doctrinal thinking. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 9; C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1880); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACTS chs. I & 11 (1974).
15. See, eg., R. GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY: HABERMAS & THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL 8-12, 23-26 (1981); J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE 235-42 (1973).
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not solely economic. If a contract is not made solely for economic
reasons, then a sole economic justification cannot be given. We need
another referent, but there is no single referent because there are a
diversity of motivations for entering into contracts and a range of con-
tracts types. More importantly, contract types should help locate the
referent.
The next step is to identify different types of contractual transac-
tions. Here I address only two: market and nonmarket transactions.
The task remains to connect a normative basis (i.e., a principal sub-
stantive criterion and a principal analytic method) with specific con-
tractual arrangements. Market transactions should be analyzed with
a more formal, economic method and nonmarket transactions with a
more particularized, morally based method. This discussion consti-
tutes the formal contribution of modem discourse. The substantive
contribution is contained in the norms of the nonlegal disciplines.
Politics, morals, and economics provide the norms used to evaluate
the sufficiency and test the legitimacy of particular contracts rules.1 6
The ambitiousness of an undertaking purporting to reconcile
competing philosophical schools is mitigated by focusing on a simple,
narrow contracts rule with an extended discussion.17 A specific rule is
used to illustrate the transformative1s power of reflective doctrinal
analysis. A legal rule is not a static thing inevitably entrenching the
status quo, it can be reconstructed19 into a positive force for social
justice.
B. Myth
The myth, based on the element of generality with two versions
and two corollaries, is: Contract law is complete (the Completeness
Myth). The myth holds contracts law can be meaningfully discussed
as a complete rules system without being broken down into constitu-
ent parts.20 It may well be that no serious scholar actually believes
16. See infra notes 162-89 & 203-11 and accompanying text.
17. The method is similar to Unger's "expanded doctrine." See Unger, supra note 5, at 576-83.
18. See, e.g., id. at 576-602; and P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSI-
TION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW ch. IV (1978).
19. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW ch. 4 (1984). Two examples
of the idea of reconstruction include Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1174 (1983); and Warren, supra note 3.
20. The perjorative label for this wholistic view of contracts is Formalism. See Grey, supra
note 9, which is an explication of the form and content of Formalism. Two attributes of Formalism
are its alleged scientism and pyramidal structure. Id.; G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 5-53. Specific
critics of Formalism in contracts include Klare, supra note 5, at 876-78; Unger, supra note 5, at 570-
[V/ol. 46:867
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this wholistic view. 21 Nevertheless, scholars frequently act as though
they do by writing about and analyzing contracts as a whole topic.
The first form the Completeness Myth takes is that contract law
is unitary. Contracts law, the scholars posit, can be explained as a
consistent body of doctrine. 22 This assertion is in the form of interdis-
ciplinary discourse because it always purports to explain contracts
law relative to another discipline. This form leads to conflicting posi-
tions when different disciplines are used. It is impossible, for exam-
ple, to justify all contracts with either a market-based economic
rationale or with a promise-based moral argument. The second ver-
sion of the Completeness Myth is that contracts law is indeterminate.
The indeterminacy claim is consistent with the primary myth that
contracts can be discussed as a whole because the claim is that the
whole of contracts is meaningless or is nonsense. Often the same
statement is made for the whole of law.23
There are two principal corollaries which flow from the Com-
pleteness Myth. The first corollary is that contracts law is based on a
single dominant criterion. For law and economics types, the criterion
76; and Feinman, supra note 5, at 831-36. Indeed, it is not much of an overstatement to say anyone
writing during the last half century is a Formalist critic.
21. See, eg., E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (1982) A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1952); Eisen-
berg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1979); Eisenberg, supra note 3; and even the econom-
ically minded Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE
L.J. 1261, 1261-62 (1980): "Indeed, common law 'bargain theory' is classically simple: bargained-
for promises are presumptively enforceable; nonreciprocal promises are presumptively unenforce-
able. But this disarmingly simple theory has never mirrored reality."
What distinguishes these authors, together with the bulk of mainstream contracts texts and
treatises, is their peculiar inside view the objective of which is precisely to make sense (not a muddle)
of contracts. See also Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book
Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (1984) (reviewing E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21): "It is
my contention that the publication of this book at this time may be in part a product of the increased
support from legal philosophers in recent years for traditional forms of legal reasoning based on
principle and expressed through doctrine."
22. See, eg., Grey, supra note 9, at 8:
Conceptual Order. A legal system is conceptually ordered to the extent that its substantive
bottom-level rules can be derived from a small number of relatively abstract principles and
concepts, which themselves form a coherent system. The conceptual ordering is formal
where the derivation of the decisive rules of the system from its more general principles
and concepts is demonstrative; the derivation can also take some less rigorous form, pro-
ducing an informal but ordered system.
23. See, e.g., Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, 40, 48 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) ("Rights discourse is internally inconsistent,
vacuous, or circular. Legal thought can generate equally plausible rights justifications for almost
any result."); Feinman, supra note 5, at 849 ("At best, contracts embodies a temporary compromise
without coherence.").
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is efficiency.2 4  For the more philosophically minded, contracts are
based on the moral principle of voluntary obligation.2 5 And, for polit-
ical ideologues, contracts law is a constitutive component of the su-
perstructure of the state.26 Note that the Completeness Myth is not
24. The generality with which law and economics scholars discuss contracts is exemplified by
A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at 1-2:
The law of contracts regulates, among other kinds of transactions, the purchase and sale of
goods (including real estate) and services. Since buying and selling-and related transac-
tions, such as leasing and borrowing, which are also governed by contract law-are
quintessentially economic activities, it would seem that economics should have something
useful to say to students of contract law. For example, economics may be able to tell us
why people make contracts and how contract law can facilitate the operation of markets.
And to the extent that contract doctrines reflect judicial efforts, whether deliberate or un-
conscious, to achieve efficiency, economics may help toward an understanding of the mean-
ing of the doctrines and their appropriate limits ....
The fundamental economic principle with which we begin is that if voluntary ex-
changes are permitted-if, in other words, a market is allowed to operate-resources will
gravitate toward their most valuable uses.
The principle is the same whether we are speaking of the purchase of a string of pearls,
a lawyer's time, a machine for making shoes, or an ingot of aluminum. The existence of a
market-a locus of opportunities for mutually advantageous exchanges-facilitates the al-
location of the good or service in question to the use in which it is most valuable, thereby
maximizing the wealth of society.
25. See generally C. FRIED, supra note 3, at 5-6 (1981):
I begin with a statement of the central conception of contract as promise. This is my
version of the classical view of contract proposed by the will theory and implicit in the
assertion that contract offers a distinct and compelling ground of obligation. In subsequent
chapters I show how this conception generates the structure and accounts for the complex-
ities of contract doctrine. Contract law is complex, and it is easy to lose sight of its essen-
tial unity. The adherents of the "Death of Contract" school have been left too free a rein
to exploit these complexities. But exponents of the view I embrace have often adopted a far
more rigid approach than the theory of contract as promise requires. For instance, they
have typically tended to view contractual liability as an exclusive principle of fairness, as if
relief had to be either based on a promise or denied altogether. These rigidities and ex-
cesses have also been exploited as if they proved the whole conception of contract as prom-
ise false. In developing my affirmative thesis I show why classical theory may have
betrayed itself into such errors, and I propose to [sic] perennial conundrums solutions that
accord with the idea of contract as promise and with decency and common sense as well.
Professor Fried later toned down his belief in the moral unity of contracts law. Fried, supra note 9,
at 37: "I have not abandoned my doubts about the economic, sociological, or historicist views of the
law. Lately, however, I have begun to feel doubts about the moralizing of the law as well." See also
id. at 53-57 (Fried's elaboration of the weaknesses of generality as treating law too instrumentally).
26. An example of the political view of contracts appears in Gabel & Feinman, supra note 5, at
183:
The central point to understand from this is that contract law today constitutes an elabo-
rate attempt to conceal what is going on in the world. Contemporary capitalism bears no
more relation to the imagery of contemporary contract law than did nineteenth-century
capitalism to the imagery of classical contract law. Contemporary capitalism is a coercive
system of relationships that more or less corresponds to the brief description given here.
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connected with a specific ideology, instead it is asserted and held by
persons situated all along the ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, it is
ideology bounded. The completeness view of contracts is colored by
normative values and ideological content inherent in the specific disci-
pline to which contracts is being referred.
The second corollary is that contracts analysis should employ a
single methodology. There is a tendency, along ideological grounds,
to align a particular methodology with the discipline's guiding crite-
rion. Law and economics analysis, for example, utilizes a rules-based
system geared to formulating socially desirable rules through ex ante
analysis.27 Because economic efficiency is the polestar, contracts
rules, principles, and policies are evaluated by how well they contrib-
ute to a better society measured by wealth maximization. 28 These are
The proof of this statement inheres in the situations we all face in our daily lives in the
functional roles to which we are consigned: lawyer, secretary, student, tenant, welfare
recipient, consumer of the products and services of Exxon, Citibank, and Sears. Despite
the doctrines of reliance and good faith, large business corporations daily disappoint our
expectations as to how they should behave. Despite the doctrine of unconscionability, un-
fairness is rampant in the marketplace. In this reality our narrow functional roles produce
isolation, passivity, unconnectedness, and impotence. Contract law, like the other images
constituted by capitalism, is a denial of these painful feelings and an apology for the system
that produces them.
Most of the time the socioeconomic system operates without any need for law as such
because people at every level have been imbued with its inevitability and necessity. When
the system breaks down and conflicts arise, a legal case comes into being. This is the
"moment" of legal ideology, the moment at which lawyers and judges in their narrow,
functional roles seek to justify the normal functioning of the system by resolving the con-
flict through an idealized way of thinking about it.
But this also can be the moment for struggle against the narrow limits imposed in law
on genuine values such as freedom, equality, moral community, and good faith. By ques-
tioning whether the legal system helps or hinders the actual realization of those values in a
meaningful sense in everyday life, the critical approach permits us to expose the illegiti-
macy of the system and to explore the possibility of a different order of things. (emphasis
in original)
See also Kairys, Legal Reasoning in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 11 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982) ("Law is simply politics by other means.") Id. at 17.
I suggest that it is no linguistic accident that the wholistic, interdisciplinary voice speaks about
contract(s) in the singular. Notice the titles in the last three footnotes: Contract as Promise; The
Economics of Contract Law; and Contract as Ideology. The singular usage naturally promotes dis-
cussing contract(s) law generally and furthers the skewing of contracts discourse.
27. Ex ante analysis is a form of prospective or policy argumentation. The primary question
posed is: What will the effects of a rule or decision be? Ex ante analysis is contrasted with ex post
analysis which attempts to resolve a past dispute between parties. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 19, at 53-55, 73-78; Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward: The Court and
the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-12, 19-33 (1984).
28. See, eg., Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509
(1980); Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
1985]
878 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
societal arguments preferring future social gain over past individual
interest as the evaluative test. The methodology best accomplishing
this goal is a formalistic utilitarian calculus which starts with a desire
to establish forward looking social goals.29 This method focuses on
the future applicability of rules in an effort to promote uniformity and
predictability facilitating and advancing commercial transactions. 30
This formalist methodology is consciously less flexible 31 than more
particularized adjudication and is interested in reducing transaction
costs by lessening litigation. The successor to formalism, situation-
sense,32 opens the contracting process slightly by attempting to honor
the needs of merchants in identifiable markets33 much along the lines
of the development of the Law Merchant. 34 Situation-sense can be
used to advance societal goals or to remedy injustice to individuals as
long as those individuals are traders in a marketplace.
The method used by advocates of a moral basis for contracts
starts with the transaction and the place of individuals in the con-
tracting process35 instead of concentrating on the consequences of the
rule that will emerge. It is motivated by a desire to define and secure
rights. The method uses ex post analysis and is more rights-based and
Kantian than market-oriented and utilitarian. Contracts will be
honored or enforced only to the extent parties are fairly situated.
29. See C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG ch. 4 (1978); Michelman, Norms and Normativity in
the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978). But see R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE ch. 3 (1981); Coleman, supra note 28 (law and economics analysis distinguished from
utilitarianism).
30. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1263-64 ("A liability or damages rule induces
contracting parties to adapt their behavior in ways that will affect social welfare."). The large claim
made by law and economics proponents is that law is (should be) efficient. But see Epstein, The
Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982) (common law rules not
necessarily efficient); Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983) (same).
31. See Grey, supra note 9, at 11-32.
32. See Feinman, supra note 11, at 698-708; Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in
Commercial Law: Llewellyn Redux (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1495, 1496-1500 (1984)
(reviewing L. TRAKMAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW (1983));
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 121-57 (1960).
33. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102; J. WHITE & R. SOMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-7 (2d ed. 1980).
34. W. MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT 156 (1904):
The whole history of Law Merchant in Europe during the Middle Ages was characterized
by a constant advance towards uniformity and by the successful assertion of new principles
of law. It was developed in local courts, in which directly or indirectly the merchants
declared the law. The merchants of the fair courts of St. Ives, or the merchants and marin-
ers of Barcelona, were alike the "doomsmen" of the court; it was the function of the judge
merely to proclaim and execute the judgment of the merchants.
35. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 11, at 708-12.
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Moral norms also take on an aspect of paternalism by protecting indi-
viduals against themselves. 36 Although no sophisticated analyst can
ignore the effects of a rule, one can emphasize a preference for rights
over end-states. A rights-based method is more particularized, plac-
ing less importance on uniformity and predictability particularly in
the face of claims of individual unfairness.
The indeterminacy version of the Completeness Myth also has
two corollaries. Proponents of the Completeness Myth argue that
contracts law is in theoretical disarray at best and is a tool of domina-
tion and oppression at worst.37 They argue that there is no single
criterion because competing criteria can be posited with equal convic-
tion. Therefore, contracts law is meaningless. To buttress their claim
of indeterminacy, they argue that there is no single contract method-
ology, instead, there are competing methodologies as the above
paragraphs describe.38 The lack of a single criterion and single meth-
odology irretrievably fractures contracts law in the critical view.
In practice, the methodology of those who push a political analy-
sis, particularly those of the critical school, rejects the formal method
of economic analysis and the particular method of moral philosophy.
Rather, they employ variations of a method of Marxian deconstruc-
tion, 39 depending on their ideological end-point,4° as a social critique
rather than as an analysis of substantive contracts law. Note, I have
attributed to the proponents of indeterminacy an apparently contra-
dictory position. I have said that the political school uses and es-
chews a single criterion and a single method. This central
contradiction in their thought remains unaddressed. They mock the
tools of legal analysis announcing the incoherence of law because no
single method works. Yet, they advocate a position and use a
method, then refuse to apply the method to their own analysis or an-
nounce their own program.41 Is it not likely to follow that from the
36. See, e.g., Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983); Ken-
nedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Com-
pulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
37. See supra notes 5 & 6.
38. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 11.
39. See, eg., R. GEUSS, supra note 15, ch. 3.
40. Compare Unger, supra note 5 and R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 238-42 (1976)
(attempt to reconceive law and society) with Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1984) (adamantly refusing to posit a positive reconstruction of law).
41. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 11, at 718 & n.160; Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1377-88 (1984). Professor Feinman, in graciously com-
menting on an earlier version of this Article, refutes my assertion that critical legal studies persons
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ashes of their deconstruction a particularly colored Phoenix will rise?
The two versions of the Completeness Myth with their corol-
laries are capable of reconciliation by realizing that as myth, the argu-
ments are partially true but, in their excesses, are necessarily partially
false. One can adopt the view that contracts law is not unitary with-
out accepting the countervailing conclusion that contracts law is
hopelessly indeterminate. Without designing a complete synthesis of
the two sets of arguments, an impossible task in the space of an arti-
cle, the reconciliation can be demonstrated along the following lines.
Neither contracts law nor contracts methods is uniform. There are
distinct types of contractual situations, some of which require more
certainty and predictability than others. These more uniform situa-
tions are market transactions. Market contracts can and should be
analyzed with a more formal methodology. Similarly, there are other
situations, nonmarket transactions, which can and should be analyzed
with a more particularized approach. The market/nonmarket dis-
tinction attempts to honor individual and social interests without
reaching the conclusion that contracts law is woefully indeterminate.
C. Meaning
The meaning uncovered after the myth is exposed is only briefly
described here because Parts III and IV define the market/nonmarket
distinction in detail and analyze supporting policies. This distinction
allows competing norms of politics, markets, and morals to coexist
and the dynamic of the law to move forward instead of grinding to a
halt while competing theoretical claims are resolved. Market norms
are given play in certain situations and moral norms in others. They
cohabitate a political universe designed to accommodate pluralist in-
terests, and law is seen as a mechanism mediating pluralist conflicts.
Ordinary contracts are bargain-based, private, voluntary ar-
rangements between parties of roughly equal bargaining strength. In
a market,42 where choices are relatively unconstrained, information is
fairly freely available, and prices are generally reasonably set, a for-
mal, rule-oriented body of doctrine can be established with societal
goals in mind. Individuality is honored and social welfare is pro-
moted by a coherent set of uniform and predictable contracts rules.
do not use their method to criticize their thought. He refers to Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 40, as
support. I will let intrepid souls read this "dialogue" to see if it is an effective critical legal studies
self-analysis.
42. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
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However, there are a great many contractual arrangements falling
outside the "ordinary law of contracts," and market-based justifica-
tions are either inapposite or counterproductive. 43 Therefore, a set of
market-honoring rules supported by social policies makes sense only
for ordinary contracts.
Market-based rules distort contracts law in nonmarket situa-
tions. Uniformity and predictability may foster markets. Those at-
tributes also tilt the market toward those already in power such as
persons who initially set contract terms and prices in disregard of the
needs and desires of both parties. 4 When there is no market or when
the market breaks down, however, all market bets are off. A
nonmarket transaction arises due to either the peculiar relationship of
the parties or the specialized subject matter of the contract. Condi-
tions of monopoly45 or oligopoly46 or the structure of the firm or in-
dustry47  skew contractual relationships by disadvantageously
empowering one of the parties. Sometimes the subject matter of the
contract alters the need for a prospective rules-based system because
no market exists for trading the stuff of the contract. Personal serv-
ices, unique goods, land sales, or nonpecuniary trades are examples of
subject-matter specific contracts the enforcement of which is not com-
pletely contained within a market-based rules system. With no mar-
ket in which to exercise choice, the parties cannot bargain freely or
fairly. With no market in which to trade the subject matter of the
contract, objective value cannot be assigned. In these nonmarket situ-
ations, when a breach of contract gives rise to a claim for relief, the
focus must shift from pursuing broad societal goals to promoting indi-
vidual justice in the circumstances of the case sub judice.
This particularized or individualized approach appears need-
lessly ad hoc only if the focus is on the need for a prospective rules
system. A set of consistent workable decisional rules and principles48
can be developed for nonmarket transactions by keying on the subject
43. See Rakoff, supra note 19, at 1175.
44. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 778-85.
45. E.g., Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,
22 J. LAW & ECON. 233 (1979).
46. Oligopolies raises more problems for contracts law than monopolies which are frequently
regulated. The primary problem is one of proof. How do litigants avoid turning oligopolistic con-
tract disputes into, in Arthur Lef's phrase, mini-antitrust suits?
47. Rakoff, supra note 19, at 1220-48. Rakoff argues that the organizational and managerial
structure of the firm created the need for use of adhesion contracts. Firm structure must be assessed
in the evaluation and reevaluation of the rules of law in this area.
48. The debate between rules and principles is best carried on between H.L.A. HART, THE
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matter of the contract, the relationship of the parties, or the nature of
the transaction. Individual interests are honored because emphasis is
placed on the contract and on the parties. Social interests are
respected because rules will be formulated giving notice to all players,
engaging in distorted market or nonmarket transactions, that they
cannot seek refuge behind rules designed to mimic or reproduce
markets. 49
D. Method
Methodology is necessary to discern the meaning of the myth
and to separate the real from the artificial and the useful from the
polemical. Interdisciplinary discourse demonstrates how method and
substance are normatively enfolded. The closer the connection be-
tween a chosen method and a substantive criterion the sturdier the
analysis, because form and content are self-reinforcing. Economic
analysis employs a utilitarian calculus rather than ad hoc adjudication
because its objective is to promote social end goals. Particularized
adjudication stultifies this desire but promotes a system which defines
initial rights with increasing clarity.
The method used here, reflective doctrinal analysis, has two basic
characteristics. The first, the reflective leg of the analysis, consists of
self-conscious awareness of the connection between form and content,
sensitivity to the artificiality of legal categories, and willingness to
evaluate itself as a useful methodology. The reflective aspect explic-
itly asks "Of what value is method?" The question is not trivial. In-
deed, it is the central question for modern jurisprudence.
Done self-consciously, reflective doctrinal analysis leads to law
reform and is itself part of the transformative effort. A reflective
method is honest, open, explicit, and articulate about the values con-
tained in the method itself and the substantive rules being formulated
and applied. Reflective doctrinal analysis articulates, as explicitly as
possible, motivating values and policy choices even when the policy
choices are dichotomized into apparently conflicting sets such as indi-
vidualism and collectivism. 50 The method consciously attempts to
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) and R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, chs. 1-3. Add to this debate Kennedy,
supra note 5, in which he differentiates "standards" from rules.
49. Coleman, Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic
Approach to Law, 94 ETHICS 649, 657-59 (1984).
50. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209, 211-13
(1979) in which he refers to the struggle between individualism and collectivism as the "fundamental
contradiction":
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work out and resolve or to describe and accept tensions among com-
peting norms. In some instances, law resolves conflicts by refined or
"expanded" 5' doctrinal analysis. At other times, conflicts are con-
sciously embraced not merely "tolerated." By embracing conflicts,
tension among competing norms is accepted as a good dynamic
within law and within society. What keeps all of this tension from
creating complete indeterminancy is the system's commitment to me-
diation. This means that the search for the best state of social or indi-
vidual life takes place within a system generating a dynamic pattern of
compromises and accommodations.5 2 Furthermore, a well-structured
search for justice is trusted more than a well-defined best end state.
The second characteristic, the doctrinal part of the method, ana-
lyzes specific, substantive rules of law in their prospective and retro-
spective applications. This backwards-forwards analysis
53
concentrates on the content and application of a rule of law rather
than on the place of rules in the legal system or the place of law in
society. These latter issues are not ignored; however, they are not
given primacy. Analysis is doctrinal when a rule is followed through
various identifiable levels such as fact finding, choice, application, and
policy analysis describing and evaluating the rule's efficacy.54 Reflec-
tive doctrinal analysis tests the sufficiency of a rule of law and reforms
the rule if it is not supported by sound policy or policies. These ana-
lytic layers are the normal stuff of lawyerly thinking. Reflective doc-
trinal analysis is very much an "inside" view of law glancing outward
to establish its bearings. The explicit program of reflective doctrinal
analysis is to make sense of and do law as opposed to make sense of
Here is an initial statement of the fundamental contradiction: Most participants in
American legal culture believe that the goal of individual freedom is at the same time
dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is necessary to
achieve it ....
The fundamental contradiction-that relations with others are both necessary to and
incompatible with our freedom-is not only intense. It is also pervasive.
See also id. at 258-61 & 294-300.
51. See Unger, supra note 5, at 576-83.
52. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); D. MACLEAN &
C. MILLS (eds.), LIBERALISM RECONSIDERED (1983); and Unger, supra note 5, at 620 ("This dishar-
mony can be resolved by any number of practical compromises.").
53. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
54. The classic description of legal analysis is E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REA-
SONING (1949). See also Fried, supra note 9; Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 138 (1984).
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law for the purpose of placing law into another discipline's ideological
context.
For the ideological left, traditional doctrinal analysis is an ex-
treme example of the poverty of legal thinking and is a mask for
"deeper" political/social meaning. 55 For the right, to debunk the rule
of law as indeterminate is anarchy leading to the disintegration of or-
der.56 Instead, an efficient rules system is desirable in and of itself
because of the autonomous nature of law. The centrist rejects the
polar positions believing law, politics, and society influence but do not
completely determine each other. Relative to contracts, promising is
the basis of contracts because, through this social device, individuals
voluntarily connect with each other with bonds of trust and enforcing
contracts promotes a market economy. Therefore, contracts methods
should be sensitive to individual interests and willing to correct mar-
ket imperfections in order to promote fairness. Each camp, as evi-
denced by their rhetoric, fights a difficult battle claiming too much in
face of competing interests. The interdisciplinary fight over the na-
ture of contract doctrine is emblematic of other oxen to be gored. I
leave them their fight in order to claim other ground.
E. The Meaning of the Method
Choice of method is not a neutral maneuver. Rather, it is a phe-
nomenon in which form and substance are normatively and ideologi-
cally interrelated. 57 Thus, the question is fairly and rightly raised
"What is the normative/ideological content of reflective doctrinal
analysis?" The answer is that this method is most closely connected
with liberalism.58
55. See, e.g., Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE I
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); Kairys, supra note 26.
56. Judge Robert Bork of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit is attributed to be a hardline follower of the rule of law. See Dworkin, Reagan's Justice,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS 27 (Oct. 8, 1984).
57. See Feinman, supra note 11; Kennedy, supra note 5.
58. I have drawn this description of a liberal theory of law from its proponents, its critics, and
those responding to the critics. The proponents would include, J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); R. DWORKIN, supra note 5; and B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980). The critics include Klare, supra note 3; Kennedy, supra notes 3 & 50; Frug, supra note 39.
Reactions to the critics would include Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said than Done, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1466 (1983) (book review of THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
(D. Kairys ed. 1982)); Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984); Shiffrin, Liberalism,
Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 (1983); see also West, Liberalism Redis-
covered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1985).
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The values or norms implicit in the method and explicit in the
description of liberalism contain the following beliefs: First, the state
is seen as an important (sometimes valued, sometimes feared) actor in
a modern polity. The conception of the activist state59 captures the
idea that the state can and must mediate conflicts between the one and
the many. More specifically, the state, as protector of individual
rights, realigns power through redistributions of wealth. Simultane-
ously, the state poses a threat which cannot be discounted. Therefore,
the concept of government under law is relied on both to support the
state's mediating role and to check its abuse of power.
Liberal doctrinal analysis represents a self-conscious attempt to
describe the "second best" social state while maintaining a healthy
skepticism about either waiting for the best state or believing that the
endeavor to find the best state will be successful. 6° The claim about
the second best state is both modest and pragmatic. Liberal analysts
(sometimes with claims of neutrality) cautiously approach a vision of
what the best state is or should be. At the same time, life must go on,
so a legal system is designed allowing and encouraging participation
by pluralist interests. Reflective doctrinal analysis, therefore, adopts a
mediating posture grounded in the desire to do law as a means of
making sense of and living in a complex world.
When reflective doctrinal analysis is applied specifically to the
law of contracts, the legislature and the judiciary enter the con-
tracting process to help mediate conflicts about the allocation of
power. A premium is placed on law and legal argument as valuable
contributions to daily life. Law and legal argument are not deni-
grated as inevitable tools of the dominant class. Contracts method,
then, is a decisionmaking process accepting the concept of the rule of
law as useful and using the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent,
even with their slippage, as positive factors allowing attorneys to con-
struct useful arguments for their clients.
Reflective doctrinal analysis is aware of the connection between
content and process and is willing to ascertain its own content and
measure itself against the norms of liberal theory. If the method is
59. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR ch. 1 (1981); B. ACKER-
MAN, supra note 19, chs. 1 & 2.
60. Doing law, as opposed to conceiving a perfect legal order, puts us squarely in the middle of
an imperfect world. A perfectly just world would require no law; it would be a Utopia. See, e.g.. G.
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Thus, I envision law as an attempt to achieve a
second best state the conception of which entails the acceptance of competing principles and values.
B. ACKERMAN, supra note 58, at 21-29.
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insufficient to further the ends of liberalism, it must be retooled. Put
less ideologically, if reflective doctrinal analysis retards the growth of
law by stifling participation or not fairly mediating conflicts, it should
be discarded or replaced. Therefore, reflective doctrinal analysis re-
fuses to be bound to the Completeness Myth. At the level of applica-
tion, there is no single criterion guiding liberalism, 61 a fortiori, there is
no single methodology for legal analysis. Contracts methods and con-
tracts rules are dictated by contract types.
Instead of superimposing a market-based rules system and its
correlative analytic method upon all contracts, the contract type is
the basis for fashioning rules and generating appropriate methods.
Market-based transactions use an economic method and are justified
on economic grounds. Nonmarket or promise-based contract types,
are more particular and find justification in moral arguments.
Finally, reflective doctrinal analysis facilitates liberalism's at-
tempt to mediate conflicts between the one and the many by honoring
and accommodating competing interests such as those asserted to ad-
vance individual fairness and social goals.62 There are two ways to
mediate conflicts. The legal system can either create a hierarchy of
value choices in which one set of values takes precedence or create
separate categories. 63
The market/nonmarket distinction is an example of a categorical
approach to legal analysis. In some categories (market cases), one
contracts method will be used; in other categories (nonmarket cases),
another method will be used. In clear market transactions, a more
formal, rule-oriented system is used because everyone who plays in
the market plays by the rules and wants to know the rules. The play-
ers and the game are honored because the rules reflect the tacit agree-
ment made by all. The tacit agreement is that a rules-oriented, formal
system is desirable in clear market transactions because certainty and
predictability are valued. In clear nonmarket transactions, a particu-
larized approach is necessary and desirable. The need for certainty is
obviated by the need for justice or fairness and by the absence of a
market. There is a new game. There are new players, and a new set
61. Shiffrin, supra note 58, at 1192-1215.
62. Kennedy, supra note 52. Why is the "fundamental contradiction" cast in such disparing
tones? We can assume that the accuracy of the description, Le., self and others, (individual and
collectivity) are incompatible at times and see this as an opportunity for personal and social growth
and development instead of as a world mired in despair and paralyzed by conflict.
63. Categorization is a means for doing law. See Grey, supra note 9; Kennedy, supra note 52,
at 214-16.
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of rules must be used conforming with a sense of individualized justice
because the underlying bases of the tacit agreement have dissolved.
Uniformity and predictability are less valued than individual justice
and fairness in nonmarket situations. Again, the system is honored
because everyone knows or should know that the values of a formal,
rule-oriented system do not function in cases of market breakdown.
The above categories honor both individual and social arguments
in clear cases. In ambiguous cases, cases in which there is no clear
market or no clear nonmarket, the fight over categorization continues.
However, the fight is not on the whole battlefield of contracts, that is,
whether all contracts should be formal, rule-oriented or particular,
principle-oriented. There are basically two ways of dealing with the
gray area between clear market and nonmarket cases. The first is sim-
ply to resign ourselves to continuing to categorize. Lawyering 64 and
judging65 are premised on deciding and analyzing ambiguous cases.
This task is the normal order of lawyering conceptualization-law-
yers and judges do this all the time.66 Ambiguous cases are placed
into one category or the other, or the dynamic of the legal system
generates new categories. Reflective doctrinal analysis is consciously
aware of this dynamic.
The second mediating approach adopts a hierarchy between cate-
gories. The hierarchical approach means one method and set of
norms trumps the other. If the hierarchical approach is adopted, it
should be used explicitly. Instead of implicitly favoring one set of
values over another, a decisionmaker should explicitly articulate the
values in a decision. At least for the purpose of publicity, a judge
should let people know what is going on in the opinions. 67 The hier-
archical approach, which can be used either in all ambiguous cases or
in all cases, essentially carries on the ideological battle already
discussed.
64. Fried, supra note 9.
65. R. DWORKIN, supra note 5, ch. 4.
66. Contemporary jurists who have written about their role include Newman, Between Legal
Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CAL. L. REV. 200 (1984);
Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800
(1983); Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263 (1982); Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv.
817 (1977); and Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking And The Role Of The Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 509 (1974).
67. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959); Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982
(1978).
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The liberal position would be that contracts should serve individ-
ual justice first and should use a more particularized method. The
situation of the parties should control the focus of adversarial dis-
putes. The hierarchy created puts individual justice above social
goals. The conservative version of contracts law inverts the hierarchy
by having society's needs supersede interests of individuals, because
the ultimate good is for capital expansion or market mimicking or
whatever.
All contracts problems are not resolved. Rather, the argument is
that useful sense can be made of contracts law and contracts methods.
Further, sustained doctrinal analysis elucidates categories which can
be correlated with specific methods. Consequently, we need not jump
to the conclusion that the whole process is so indeterminate as to be
meaningless. Reflective doctrinal analysis is a method fitting comfort-
ably between the conservativism of the law and economics movement
and the utopianism or nihilism of the critical school. It represents a
modernized look at the traditional liberal view of law and society and
accepts law as a useful device to reach the aspirations of justice and to
better our world.
The remainder of this Article is an exercise in the application of
reflective doctrinal analysis. Employing the market/nonmarket dis-
tinction, I will show how the analysis can explain, evaluate, and re-
form a rule of law.
III. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY FOR NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES
A. A Class of Cases
A class of cases exists which, like ghosts, wanders the nether
world between torts and contracts.68 Often, they lite as tort cases;
rarely are they defended on contractual grounds. Life in the legal
borderland 69 between torts and contracts means that sometimes the
existence of these cases is denied. They are pushed into the wrong
categories for the wrong reasons. They are ejected from the legal sys-
68. See, e.g., Fridman, The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 L.Q. REV. 422 (1977); and
O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1977).
Torts and contracts converge in areas other than the one to be discussed here most notably in the
areas of products liability and warranties. In Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO.
L.J. 875 (1985), the authors argue that torts and contracts form similar analytic patterns and ema-
nate from the same ideological bases.
69. Bolla, Contort: New Protector of Emotional Well-Being in Contract?, 19 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 561 (1983); and Note, Contorts: Patrolling the Borderland of Contracts and Tort in Legal
Malpractice Actions, 22 B.C.L. REV. 545 (1981).
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tem on procedural or evidentiary grounds. They are left ambiguous,
or new categories are suggested. These evasive procedures70 leave
someone, the plaintiff-promisee, injured, victimized, and
uncompensated.
The class shares in common the existence of a contract, generally
between a merchant and a nonmerchant, 71 which is breached by the
merchant promisor with injuries suffered by the nonmerchant prom-
isee. The unifying element of the class is a claim for money damages
as recompense for nonpecuniary harms caused by the breach. Nonpe-
cuniary losses include injury to comfort and well-being, 72 mental and
emotional distress, 73 harm to mental concern and solicitude,74 annoy-
ance and inconvenience, 75 and the "shattering of dreams."' 76 Gener-
ally, relief is denied. However, the decisions granting or denying
relief, the rules behind the decisions, and the policy arguments offered
to support both the rules and the decisions are blurry. As a direct
consequence of the faulty analysis of these cases, individual litigants
are denied relief. Further, the failure to respond adequately to re-
quests for relief adversely affects the law's legitimacy.
Cases seeking money damages for mental or emotional distress as
a result of broken promises are often discarded with the flippant re-
mark, "Well then, sue in tort." There is more than a little basis for
consigning this group of cases to the domain of torts.77 Yet, such a
response is practically unwise and intellectually unsatisfying. While
torts law provides a basis of recovery in some situations, often the
70. See infra text accompanying notes 103-36.
71. Most of the cases which grant recovery have this characteristic. That need not be the case.
See, eg., Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Hawaii 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980) (recovery allowed for
emotional distress in breach of contract action by fast-food store lessee against shopping mall opera-
tor). This analysis does not require this distinction. See also Veitch, Sentimental Damages in Con-
tract, 16 U.W.O.L. REv. 227, 235 (1977).
72. F. Becker Asphaltum & Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630, 631 (1932).
73. Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 10, 501 P.2d 368 (1972); Thomas v. French, 30 Wash.
App. 811, 638 P.2d 613 (1981); Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 62 Hawaii 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980).
74. B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979).
75. Hill v. Sereneck, 355 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
76. Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094, 1098 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 638, 358
So. 2d 641 (1978) ("The lower court awarded $5,000 to the homeowner for the mental distress-
even to the extent of seeking psychiatric help--caused by the shattering of her dreams of owning a
beautiful home.") Louisiana cases are unique in this area because claims are often premised on a
statutory cause of action based on LA. CIV. CODE § 1934(3) (1977): "Where the contract has for its
object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or some
convenience or other legal gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the parties,
yet damages are due for their breach .... "
77. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971); and infra notes 143-47.
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gravaman of the torts claim, the requisite intent78 or the outrageous 79
or reckless conduct,80 is missing, and the injured plaintiff-promisee
cannot sustain the proofs necessary to support a torts case. The
promisee must then rely on his or her contractual claim. Unfortu-
nately, the contracts side of this class of cases is not well developed.
Because of the confusion surrounding these cases, litigants may be
denied relief by labeling a cause of action incorrectly, the cases can be
wrongly pleaded,81 a tort statute of limitations can be applied to pre-
clude a contracts claim,8 2 the inappropriate remedy can be chosen, or
the case can proceed to trial on the wrong theory.8 3 As a result, no
liability is imposed on the breaching promisor.
These cases offer a classic example of the middle period in the
development of a common law rule.8 4 Once a rule has been an-
nounced, its second stage begins during which cases are included
within and without the rule,8 5 distinctions become fuzzy 8 6 and some-
78. See, e.g., McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977); Kewin v. Massachu-
setts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980) (no recovery absent proof of bad
faith). See also Veitch, supra note 71, at 230; Fridman, supra note 68, at 425-26.
79. See, e.g., Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Iowa), aif'd, 663
F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981); County Escrow Serv. v. Janes, 121 Ariz. 511, 591 P.2d 999, 1001 (Ct. App.
1979) in which the court imposed a burdensome standard of conduct: "One may recover for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, however, where the offending party's acts are so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded at [sic] atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" (citation omitted).
80. See, e.g., Fiore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 144 N.J. Super. 74, 364 A.2d 572 (Law Div.
1976); Cooperstein v. Van Natter, 26 Wash. App. 91, 611 P.2d 1332 (1980).
81. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(plaintiff must sue in tort not contract); Sellert v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 370 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (same); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Thrift, 154 Ga. App. 545, 269 S.E.2d 53 (1980)
(plaintiff precluded from recovering in tort and contract arising out of same set of facts).
82. See Note, supra note 69.
83. See, e.g., Stanbeck v. Stanbeck, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979) (The court denied
recovery to a wife who sued her ex-husband for damages for mental distress due to breach of separa-
tion agreement. The court was willing to recognize such a cause of action as long as the breach
related to a non-pecuniary item in the contract. In this case, the wife's mental distress was over ex-
husband's failure to pay increased taxes due to disallowance of wife's claimed deduction for attor-
ney's fees.).
84. See E. LEvi, supra note 56; B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)
and THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); and K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32.
85. There are a few notable cases which discuss the development of this area of law at any
length. See, e.g., Stanbeck v. Stanbeck, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979); Mieske v. Bartell Drug
Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) Ducote v. Arnold, 416 So. 2d 180 (La. Ct. App. 1980); B
& M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979). Most decisions merely assign a given case
to one of the many categories which deny recovery.
86. The most frequent blurring of distinctions occurs when a court does not specify whether
relief is based on tort or contracts principles. For example, in Hamner v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
49 Ala. App. 214, 270 So. 2d 87, 89 (1972), the court, quoting the earlier case White Roofing Co. v.
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times contradictory,87 and reasoning is questionable. All of which
leads to the demise and replacement of the rule. The hallmark of this
phase of rule development is a certain amount of lumpiness. Some
lumpiness (more charitably, flexibility) is healthy because the dy-
namic of the process allows law to adapt. Too much flexibility is
properly characterized as confusion, and this is an unhealthy state in
which the dynamic of the law breaks down.
In addition to cases falling between the cracks, attendant practi-
cal problems accompany a breakdown in analogical reasoning.
Courts are unclear about the basis for decisions. Judges are given too
much leeway in deciding whether to grant or deny relief and base
their decisions on unarticulated premises or meta-rules which are
more result-oriented than is comfortable. There is a dislocation be-
tween the espoused rule and the operative principles. 8 Labels replace
logic; prediction is weakened; claims are chilled because transaction
costs are too high; and lawyers cannot advise clients as precisely as
they might otherwise because the signals about the likelihood of re-
covery are unclear.
The confusion between the decisions and their rationales stems
from the operative facts which contain elements of torts and con-
tracts. Frequently, courts fail to make meaningful distinctions be-
tween labeling the claims as torts or contracts cases. Admittedly, the
distinction between torts and contracts, indeed the definition of all
legal categories, is artificial. However, these artificial compartments
are useful, sometimes necessary devices for articulating theories of
law.8 9 Even though legal categories do not exist in the "real" world,
they have explanative power and aid in analysis as well as theory
building. While recognizing that the artificiality of the categories gets
in the way of clear decisionmaking, the artificial distinction will be
kept momentarily for the purpose of demonstrating that these cases
can and should be justified on contracts theory instead of relying on
Wheeler, 39 Ala. App. 662, 106 So. 2d 658, 660 (1957), said: "Count One is a hybrid product, a
cross breed of tort and contract, with no pride of ancestry and no hope of progeny."
87. Compare Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) (bride allowed recovery for ill-
fitting trousseau) with Levin v. Halston, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 601, 398 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1977) (no recovery in suit by purchaser of improperly made designer dress to be worn at wedding);
compare also Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 358 So. 2d 638, 641
(La. 1978) (recovery allowed for breach of construction contract for custom made home) with Cat-
alanotto v. Hebert, 347 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (recovery denied on similar claim) and
Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1980) (recovery denied even for custom-made home).
88. Warren, supra note 3, at 919-21.
89. See, eg., id. at 906-07.
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torts law.90 Naturally, one set of facts can give rise to separate con-
tracts and torts actions. However, the sometimes intentional running
together of torts and contracts theories unnecessarily confuses this
area of the law, slights the goals of contracts law, and prevents the
dynamic of the law from functioning smoothly. Indeed, a central the-
sis of this Article is that reflective doctrinal analysis operates to pre-
vent law from stagnating. Categorization, then, is treated as a means
to the end of transformation, not as an end in itself.
This Article offers a theory to sustain a contractual claim for
nonpecuniary damages. To be successful and sufficiently powerful,
this theory should do two things. First, it should be broad enough to
look backwards and forwards. 91 The theory must provide a retrospec-
tive view of past cases and have the explanative ability to distill the
rules operating in this area. That is to say, it must describe the past
and evaluate the present. At the same time, the theory should be pro-
spective and portend the future application of the rule and should
illuminate larger trends in the law of contracts.92 The second require-
ment of a sound theory is the alignment of the rationale for imposing
contractual liability9 3 with the rationale for granting a specific rem-
edy,94 thus linking right and remedy. The contracts cases in this area
and scholars who analyze them (including those favoring recovery)
pay little or no attention to the issue of remedies.95 The reasons for
granting recovery must be consistent with and must reinforce the re-
medial measure.
A contractual right for nonpecuniary damages should be recog-
nized. First, I will survey a range of cases and the reasons courts give
for denying liability. Next, cases granting recovery will be discussed.
From those, a rule of contractual liability will be developed. Section
IV discusses remedial rules and principles. Particular attention is
paid to designing a theory of contracts damages consistent with the
rationale behind the liability rule.
90. After the analysis has run its course, we may find that the old categories are either suffi-
cient and can be maintained or that new ones, such as contorts, are necessary.
91. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 751.
92. See Conclusion infra.
93. See infra section III E.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 190-211.
95. See cases cited supra note 87. Although they discuss the basis of liability, little attention is
given to a correlative remedy. See also Veitch, supra note 71; Bolla, supra note 69; Fridman, supra
note 68; Hahlo, Contractual Damages for Mental Distress, 51 CAN. B. REV. 507 (1973); Hahlo,
Sentimental Damages, 50 CAN. B. REV. 304 (1972); and Rose, Injured Feeling and Disappointment,
55 CAN. B. REV. 333 (1977).
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B. The Pathology of the Rule Against Recovery
The general rule regarding damages for mental or emotional dis-
tress due to breach of contract is stated by the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts:
Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach
also causes bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind
that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.96
This standard is little changed from the first Restatement definition
commingling this type of case with a torts cause of action.97 The sec-
ond Restatement establishes a presumption against recovery in accord
with other general statements about this area of law.
Three symptoms characterize the demise of the rule or at least
the need for radical surgery. First, the general rule admits several
differing exceptions. There comes a point when the exceptions do in-
deed swallow the rule and that point has been reached. Although
generally proscribed, the second Restatement allows damages for
nonpecuniary harms when breach is accompanied by bodily or fore-
seeable harm. Formulations of the rule allow recovery when conduct
is tortious,98 to discourage breach of contract, 99 when the purpose of
the contract is personal rather than commercial, t°° and to curb reck-
less or wanton conduct. 01 The second symptom in the pathology of
the rule against recovery can be observed in the various reasons courts
give for denying recovery. The cases denying damages obviously ac-
cept the general prohibition. However, there is little or no consis-
tency in the opinions as to why the proscriptive rule should be
followed. Consequently, many claims go uncompensated as courts
use several evasive techniques to jettison these cases from court dock-
ets. The final symptom indicative of the breakdown of the rule is that
the cases as a class are poorly reasoned and, at times, contradic-
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981).
97. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 341 (1932):
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as compensation for mental
suffering, except where the breach was wanton or reckless and caused bodily harm and
where it was the wanton or reckless breach of a contract to render a performance of such a
character that the defendant had reason to know when the contract was made that the
breach would cause mental suffering for reasons other than mere pecuniary loss.
98. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON DAMAGES § 81 (1935); E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21,
§ 92.17 (1982); and A. CORBIN, supra note 21, § 1076.
99. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 232 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
100. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.4 (1973).
101. S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1341 (3d ed. 1968).
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tory. 10 2 The basis for the decision can be either the stated reason, the
desire for a particular result, or some unarticulated premise or value
judgment which may or may not be applied consciously by the judge.
Perhaps not so paradoxically, once these cases are analyzed, they con-
tain the seeds necessary to develop a theory of liability for nonpecu-
niary damages.
C. Cases Denying Recovery
Case law is canvassed through the use of hypotheticals to con-
struct a theory for nonpecuniary damages. First, a catalogue of rea-
sons courts have given for denying damages are discussed.
The Dream House
Home Owner and Contractor enter into a contract for the con-
struction of a custom designed home. As a result of poor
workmanship, various items of damages are noticed: There
are slight cracks in the walls; some doors are hung improperly;
the heating and air-conditioning system cannot be regulated;
there is a fissure in the concrete slab in the basement; and there
are occasional leaks. Most of these items are not noticeable to
visitors. Nevertheless, the Home Owner is painfully, con-
sciously aware of the defects. Home Owner sues. In addition
to damages for diminution in market value, Home Owner also
claims damages for mental distress caused by not having her
dream house.
The cases denying relief do so for a variety of inconsistent reasons.103
Hardline. One line of cases can be justified on no ground other
than judicial convenience. These hardline cases simply deny recovery
by refusing to entertain such suits. The most forceful case of this
genre is Whitten v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,1°4 in
which the court held: "[T]he law of this state makes no provision for
the recovery of damages for emotional distress or mental anguish re-
sulting from breach of contract, no matter what the intent of the
breaching party was in failing to fulfill its obligations."10 5 Several
other cases are slightly less emphatic in their denial by requiring the
102. See supra note 89 and compare cases infra notes 120 & 154.
103. See cases infra notes 120 & 154.
104. 468 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1977), affid, 594 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1979).
105. 468 F. Supp. at 473.
[Vol. 46:867
NONMARKET TRANSACTIONS
promisee to sue in tort rather than in contract. 106 Yet the impact on
the litigant is the same-the contracts claim is denied often with dis-
astrous consequences. 10 7
The advantage of the hardline is administrative ease-suits are
dismissed. The hardline furthers no legitimate aim other than the
weak justification of judicial convenience. The hardline ignores the
Restatement formulation, and the consequence is to encourage bad
behavior. The fallout, an unrecompensed Home Owner and a slip-
shod Contractor, is not tolerable. In effect, inefficient or slipshod con-
tractors are insulated from liability, and opportunistic behavior is
rewarded. The failure to entertain such claims puts the Home Owner
in a house for which she did not bargain.
Interpretation. The most amorphous device courts use in deny-
ing claims is the process of interpretation. 10 8 Frequently, courts deny
recovery without much more than saying that this is not the type of
contracts claim falling within an exception. Here the judge's decision-
making is most wide open. Damages have been denied for construc-
tion contracts when the court felt a custom designed home did not
qualify because the "principal object" of the contract was the house,
not emotional gratification. 10 9 Recovery has not been allowed for
faulty construction of a driveway,"10 faulty construction of a founda-
tion of a mobile home,"' and the failure to rebury a pipeline prop-
erly.112 The principle holding these cases together is the court's
interpretive determination that these contracts are not the kind people
enter for essentially nonpecuniary reasons. Rather, the courts reason,
these are motivated by pecuniary gain, and emotional distress dam-
ages will not be awarded.
These cases fail to distinguish among kinds of contracts and
106. See infra notes 122-24.
107. In Forde v. Royal's Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982), a sales clerk alleged that her
employment was terminated because she refused unsolicited sexual advances. The Florida court did
not allow the claim absent a physical impact and held: "Thus a claim for damages based on inflic-
tion of mental distress cannot be based on a mere breach of contract." Id. at 1175.
108. See THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION (E. Mitchell ed. 1982); Fiss, Objectivity and In-
terpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1982); Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765
(1982); Symposium, Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982); and Symposium, Interpreta-
tion, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
109. Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1980). See also Catalanotto v. Hebert, 347
So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
110. Plaisance v. Dutton, 336 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 1976).
111. Guidry v. Statewide Trailer Sales, 393 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 1981).
112. Elliott v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 390 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 1980).
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among motives for entering contracts. Instead, contracts are put into
overly broad classifications or wrong categories without refined elabo-
ration. Tract homes, prefabricated housing, or custom designed resi-
dences, as examples, are treated similarly even though it can be easily
argued that these contracts are entered for different purposes and with
different, often mixed motivations. Courts similarly classify other
kinds of contracts as types for which nonpecuniary damages will not
be awarded. This list includes employment contracts, 1 3 some insur-
ance contracts, 1 4 separation agreements,"15 leaseholds," 6 and con-
tracts for truck or car repairs. 117 Recovery in these cases is denied
without further allegations."l8
Our Home Owner can be, and has been, denied relief merely be-
cause the judge was of the conclusory opinion that this was the wrong
contract type. Frequently, the characterization of a contract as the
wrong type is based on an undeveloped distinction between the "per-
sonal" and the "commercial" nature of the contract. 1 9 The per-
sonal/commercial distinction makes intuitive sense insofar as
personal contracts are entered into for nonpecuniary motives by defi-
nition. The dichotomy fails in application. Courts use the distinction
to reach predetermined results and do not articulate differences
among contract types.
Physical Injury. A bright line test for determining when a claim
is properly before a court is the requirement of a physical injury, with-
out which damages are denied. °20 This requirement, also known as
113. Fisher v. General Tel. Co., 510 F. Supp. 347 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
114. Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980);
Bolden v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 422 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Sanford v. Western
Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1979); National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Vintson, 414 So. 2d
49 (Ala. 1982); Van Martin v. American Fidelity Fire Ins., 318 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
115. Stanback v. Stanback, 254 S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1979).
116. Gele v. Markey, 379 So. 2d 763 (La. App.), aff'd, 387 So. 2d 1162 (1980).
117. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976); Williamson v. Alewine,
417 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 1982).
118. In part III, subsection D it will be shown that many of these same contract types will
yield recovery if properly pleaded. See infra text accompanying notes 137-56.
119. Carroll v. Rountree, 237 S.E.2d 566 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 248 S.E.2d 725
(1978) (matrimonial client sued attorney, no recovery because this was a commercial contract); see
also D. DOBBS, supra note 100.
120. Groh v. Broadland Builders, Inc., 120 Midh. App. 214, 327 N.W.2d 443 (1982) (breach of
construction contract); Kutner v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (passen-
gers rerouted); Vanderburgh v. Porter Sheet Metal, Inc., 86 A.D.2d 688, 446 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1982)
(employer cancelled employees insurance); Martin v. Donald Park Acres at Hastings, Inc., 54
A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1976) (construction contract); Forde v. Royal's Inc., 537 F. Supp.
1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (employment contract).
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the impact rule, developed in the field of torts and is a means to cut off
the chain of causation.1 21 This rule arbitrarily cuts off valid claims.
The basis for contracts suits is the existence of emotional grief not
physical injury. Courts, however, insist on physical impact for evi-
dentiary purposes. It is easier to prove grief when a claimant points
to physical ailments attending emotional distress. Because emotional
distress does not always manifest itself physically, the trend in torts
law is to do away with the impact rule.122 There is no logical reason
to keep it in contracts law. Even the general prohibition against re-
covery is not so restrictive, and the second Restatement recognizes
that nonpecuniary items are sometimes the heart of the bargain.
Torts. The overlap of contracts law and torts law is most clearly
seen when courts overtly require the claimant to couple the contracts
claim with tortious conduct 123 or insist that an independent tort must
be pleaded.1 24 These requirements rest on the intent or conduct of the
promisor as the key to recovery and, therefore, alter the essential na-
ture of the law suit. No longer is the basis of liability the frustrated
expectations of the promisee as it would be in a contracts suit. In-
stead, liability is imposed primarily to coerce the promisor to behave
in a socially acceptable manner.125 Torts law attempts to compensate
an injured plaintiff while forcing the defendant to conform his or her
behavior to a set of duties and obligations which are socially de-
fined. 126 The contracts claim is less concerned with the conduct of the
defendant-promisor than it is with the manifest intentions of both par-
121. See, e.g., Kutner v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 553, 557-59 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
122. See, e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978).
123. See, eg., Levin v. Haiston Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 601, 398 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1972) (failure to
receive proper fitting custom designed dress did not amount to tort).
124. See, e.g., Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 645 P.2d 279 (Colo. App. 1982) (Physi-
cian-director of emergency medical services sued hospital for breach of settlement contract-tort
allegation required); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015
(1979) (insured sued for wrongful denial of coverage); DeMarco v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 360
So. 2d 134 (Fla. App. 1978) (employment contract terminated); Gellert v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 370
So. 2d 802 (Fla. App. 1979) (same); Smith v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 751
(N.D. 1980) (failure to defend automobile insurance policy).
125. See, eg., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984).
126. County Escrow Serv. v. Jones, 121 Ariz. 511, 591 P.2d 999 (1979) (defendant's conduct
must be "outrageous in character"); Sigler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 506 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.
Iowa) af'd, 663 F.2d 49 (8th Cir. 1981) ("outrageous" conduct); McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d
1090 (Del. 1977) ("willful" breach of attorney-client contract required); Kewin v. Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980) ("bad faith" refusal to pay insurance
benefits necessary); Delos v. Farmer's Ins. Group, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Reptr. 843
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ties in entering the contract, a contract which was bargained for and
agreed to by both. There is room in contracts theory for behavioral
adaptation as a secondary or incidental aspect, unlike torts in which
breach of socially defined duty is the starting point. Contracts and
torts cover different (although not mutally exclusive) interests requir-
ing protection, and protection is not afforded when the causes of ac-
tion are confused resulting in one set of claims being effectively cut
off.
It is unlikely the Contractor's conduct is so vile as to deserve
reprobation on a torts theory. More likely, the Home Owner's dream
was shattered which, in the appropriate case, ought to be and has
been compensated. Compensation should be based on the promisee's
manifest expectations and should not be used as a device to correct
promisor's defective behavior.
Remoteness. Another reason courts give for denying recovery
centers on the difficulty of proving damages for nonpecuniary harms.
Even though courts award such damages for pain and suffering, em-
barrassment, and humiliation regularly in torts cases, they are reluc-
tant to do so in contracts suits. Contracts damages rules concentrate
on certainty. 127 The duty to mitigate, the prohibition against specula-
tive damages, the rules encouraging efficient breach, and the exclusion
of punitive damages are rules promoting certainty, objectivity, and
predictability in the contracting process. These rules are useful for
facilitating commercial transactions and assisting the smooth func-
tioning of markets. 128 Claims for nonpecuniary awards appear to up-
set the market model. Similarly, these damages are denied for the
conclusory reasons that they are not in the contemplation of the par-
ties129 or are too speculative.130
A market-based rationale is inapposite to the class of contractual
situations being discussed. It is simply wrong to assert that damages
(1979) (same); Farmer's Group, Inc. v. Trimbel, 658 P.2d 1370 (Colo. App. 1982) ("willful and
wantons" conduct).
127. Consider the rules for proving damages with reasonable certainty, as opposed to specula-
tive damages, and the several mechanical damages formulas that use identifiable indicia such as
contract price or market value. The motivating factor is predictability.
128. See infra notes 160-79 and accompanying text.
129. The use of the special damages rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854), appears repeatedly in these cases and is an important organizing principle which can be
used both for and against recovery. See, e.g., Skag Way City School Bd. v. Davis, 543 P.2d 218, 225
(Alaska 1975); and Bolla, supra note 69, at 565.
130. Fogelman v. Peruvian Assoc., 127 Ariz. 504, 622 P.2d 63 (1980); Ma v. Community
Bank, 686 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1982).
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for nonpecuniary interest cannot be ascertained. Juries and judges as
fact-finders adequately perform the function, and (as later argued) a
judicial damages award is the appropriate remedy. 31 Furthermore,
there is an institutional check to prevent these claims from becoming
outlandish. The credibility of the parties will be assessed by their tes-
timony, and their greed will be tempered accordingly. The market
model should not be the dispositive basis for determining nonpecu-
niary rights and remedies. A right to damages for nonpecuniary
harms does not ignore the market model of contracts. A liability rule
favoring nonpecuniary damages is justified because these contracts are
entered primarily for nonpecuniary motives that should be honored.
Allowing nonpecuniary damages does not vitiate economic analysis
and is supported by moral and political arguments.
Procedural. The final and too often the least justifiable of tools
for denying recovery are procedural avoidance techniques ignoring
substantive issues. Courts avoid cases on the evidentiary ground that
the burden of proof was not met, 132 pleadings were wrong, 133 suit
should be brought under a statute,134 or principles of federalism re-
quired a United States district court to defer to state courts rather
than make new law. 135 Another way courts skirt the issue is to grant
relief but award nominal damages. 136 When procedural rules are used
to avoid hard issues, substantive law is ignored and law remains
poorly developed. Naturally, there are important justifications for de-
ciding cases on procedural grounds. However, in this area of law,
procedural dispositions are generally not supported with assertions
that denial of relief is necessary to advance some institutional goal.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 201-11.
132. Black v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App. 3d 901, 160 Cal. Reptr. 528 (1979) (no evi-
dence of anxiety due to nonpayment of insurance claim); Cooperstein v. Van Natter, 26 Wash. App.
91, 611 P.2d 1332 (1980) (plaintiff failed to prove that defendant had reason to know of nonpecu-
niary loss); Seymour v. Lousiana Soil Stabilization Co., 381 So.2d 571 (La. App. 1980) (nonpecu-
niary losses not proven to be part of the contract); Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth,
368 So. 3d 747 (La. App.), cert denied, 371 So. 2d 833, 834 (1979) (same); Martin v. AAA Brick
Co., 386 So. 2d 987 (La. App. 1980) (same).
133. Hamner v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 49 Ala. App. 214, 270 So. 2d 87 (1972) (plaintiff
needed to plead and prove tort); Orkin Exterminating, Co. v. Thrift, 154 Ga. App. 545, 269 S.E.2d
53 (1980) (same); Bertozzi v. McCarthy, 164 Conn. 463, 323 A.2d 557 (1973) (same).
134. Jerome v. Michigan Mut. Auto. Co., 100 Mich. App. 685, 300 N.W.2d 371 (1981).
135. Wells v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1981). See also Carpel v. Saget
Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (case for emotional damages dismissed because of
failure to satisfy $10,000 jurisdictional limit).
136. See Kluczynski v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 76 L 11915, slip op. at 10-14 (I11. Ct. Cl. Feb.
19, 1982).
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In the Dream House case, any of the above reasons can be used to
prevent recovery on a contracts claim. A court can take the hardline
and refuse to hear the claim at all. Or, physical impact or a separate
tort can be required. Or, this can be the type of case not suiting the
jurisprudence of the court. Finally, damages can be denied as too
remote. Home Owner, given the facts of the hypothetical, can fail to
surmount any of the hurdles. Yet, the hurt of now owning something
less than bargained for explicitly remains, and the promisee's prom-
ised dream is frustrated.
D. Cases Granting Recovery
There are three groups of cases granting recovery. These are dis-
cussed with a view to constructing a workable liability rule.
The Vacation Victim
Vacationer contacts a Charter Service which arranges a pack-
age deal for Vacationer and friends. The package includes
round trip transportation to Hawaii from Colorado and a two-
week stay in Hawaii with ten days of sailing around the islands
on a premier nineteenth century sailing vessel. After their ar-
rival in Hawaii, Vacationers learn that the sailing vessel is
barely seaworthy, substitute vessels at the same price are un-
available, and they cannot afford a more costly ship. Vaca-
tioners are forced to stay on an overcrowded island for the
two-week duration rather than sail from island to island as
promised. 137
The safest basis for recovery, as indicated by the previous sec-
tion, is on torts theory. The complaint should allege either that the
Charter Service failed to exercise proper care in the performance of its
duty or that the Charter Service intentionally misrepresented the va-
cation package. Clearly, it is foreseeable that the promisees' "dream
vacation" would be turned into a "mess" if the boat is unavailable. It
is a breach of duty to dishonor a contract by failing to deliver the
promised vacation package. 138 Under either negligence or misrepre-
sentation, liability is premised on the occurrence of a tort. 139 Liability
137. Harris v. Waikane Corp., 484 F. Supp. 372 (D. Hawaii 1980).
138. See Kluczynski v. Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 76 L 11915, slip op. at 10-14 (Ill. Ct. CI. Feb.
19, 1982); Vick v. National Airlines, Inc., 409 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1982).
139. See, e.g., Rothenberg v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 495 F. Supp. 399 (D.D.C. 1980)
(tort for breach of moving contract).
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is imposed to correct wrong conduct.
There are two problems, however, with limiting recovery to tort-
like claims. First, the Charter Service's conduct may not attain the
requisite culpability, in which case there is no liability. Second, dam-
ages are correlated with the promisor's conduct, not on the promisee's
alleged injury. The theory behind granting recovery in these suits is
that the promisor's behavior in breaching the contract is akin to a tort
because there is a duty to honor a contract.'14 While this may be
good torts analysis (although questionable), it is bad contracts law.
Contracts law recognizes a party's power to breach as long as they
stand ready to accept the consequences by paying damages. 141 The
Charter Service escapes liability if Vacationer cannot show culpabil-
ity. The Charter Service, therefore, has several available defenses. It
may have made an honest mistake, for example. Although mistake is
enough of a defense to avoid tort-like liability, it does not alleviate the
disappointment. Further, this disposition fails to honor the contract.
The availability of the premier sailing vessel was the key element of
the bargain, and both parties knew this. Vacationers quite simply did
not get their bargain.
The Fashion Fatality
Bride arranges with Milliner to have five dresses made for use
on her honeymoon. Bride is to marry a man of wealth and
social standing, and she herself belongs to the same social
class. The dresses which were ordered should have been
things of beauty and delightful for a young bride to wear since
they were to come from the leading millinery establishment of
the leading city of the South. However, the dresses did not fit.
Bride was "overcome by disappointment and chagrin" and
was ashamed to wear the tasteless trousseau. 142
The second category of cases grants recovery not precisely on
contracts or torts grounds. Rather, the distinction is blurred, and this
class of cases may properly be called contorts after Grant Gilmore's
140. See, eg., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 206 Cal. Reptr. 354 (Cal.
1984) (tort action available for breach of contract).
141. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897): "The duty to keep a
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it and
nothing else."
142. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1003, 34 So. 66 (1903).
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coinage. 143 These cases are pulled in two directions. Compensation is
made for the emotional disturbance suffered by the Bride promisee
and as a way of correcting the bad behavior of the Milliner promisor.
The difference between this category and the first is the recognition
that the defendant promisor knew or should have known about the
nonpecuniary harms occasioning breach. Here the contractual basis
of liability begins to emerge. For the first time in the discussion of
these cases, the contractual relationship is addressed. What the
promisor knew or should have known is a necessary element of liabil-
ity. Knowledge is the basis for allocating risks either explicitly or
implicitly. The drug store held responsible for losing thirty-two fifty-
foot reels of family film left in their care for splicing was told by the
promisee: "Don't lose these, they are my life."' 144 The cosmetology
college charged with knowing inadequate instruction would not pre-
pare their students to pass the state licensing examination was also
liable for damages. 145 Likewise, when faulty construction means a
family has no use of kitchen facilities, inadequate sleeping quarters,
no hot or cold water, and insect infestation,146 or when hotel reserva-
tions are not honored and people must stay in an inferior hotel,147 or
when a mall operator knowingly breaches a lease, 148 emotional dam-
ages have been awarded against promisors imputed with the knowl-
edge that their breach would cause nonpecuniary harms.
That courts allow monetary awards in these cases is clear. What
is less clear is the basis for measuring the awards. Courts have been
satisfied with running torts and contracts law together in a semicon-
scious effort to create a new category of liability. The running to-
gether of torts and contracts without clearly delineating the limits of
the new category fails to provide either a predictable basis for the
future application of the rules or adequate theoretical guidance.
Combining torts and contracts without elaboration is also unwise, be-
cause it fails to concentrate on protecting the expectations of
promisees.
The Unburied Body
143. G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at 87-90. See also Bolla, supra note 69; and Note, supra note
69.
144. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979).
145. Thomas v. French, 30 Wash. App. 811, 638 P.2d 613 (1982).
146. Ducote v. Arnold, 416 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 1982).
147. Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 54 Hawaii 18, 501 P.2d 368 (1972).
148. Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Hawaii 1980).
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Children of the deceased contract with Mortician to have the
remains of their dearly beloved mother buried in a vault. In-
stead, Mortician, in callous disregard of the contract, dumped
the body in a shallow grave. Mother's corpse was unearthed
by heavy equipment working in the area, and Children natu-
rally suffered mental anguish when they learned that Mom did
not rest in peace. 149
Recovery in this group rests more squarely on contracts princi-
ples than do the other two classifications. What else were Children
bargaining for other than the peace of mind that their deceased
mother would be buried properly? The object of the contract was
peace of mind; its primary concern was mental solicitude. Both par-
ties bargained for the exchange of goods or services intended to bring
emotional comfort or satisfaction to the promisee for a sum certain to
the promisor. These are at most one-sided, pecuniary transactions,
and market principles are only partially applicable. Mortician re-
ceives a fee in exchange for his "consideration for the afflicted,' ' 150
because he deals in the "tenderest feelings of the human heart." 15'
Similarly, an obstetrician who knows of special circumstances sur-
rounding a pregnancy and delays arrival at the delivery room until
after the birth of a stillborn child must compensate the promisee for
the mental aggravation of not being with the patient to console her as
assured.' 52
Promisors have been held liable for damages in less delicate situ-
ations such as the failure to supply music to a wedding reception, t53
faulty construction, 54 breach of warranty to repair a car while prom-
isees are vacationing, 55 or for breach of a contract for nursing home
149. Golston v. Lincoln Cemetery, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
150. Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535, 536-37 (1932). See
also Allinger v. Kell, 302 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
151. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (1949) (failure to inter hus-
band's body properly); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Reptr. 445 (1980) (mortuary
lost cremated remains); see also Rideout's-Brown Serv., Inc. v. Holloway, 397 So. 2d 125 (Ala.
1981).
152. Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981). See also Stewart v.
Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
153. Deitsch v. Music Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 453 N.E.2d 1302 (1983).
154. F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, 224 Ala. 696, 141 So. 630 (1932); Mid-
States Homes, Inc. v. Bice, 381 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 1978); Hill v. Sereneck, 355 So. 2d 1129 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1978); Whitener v. Clark, 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 638, 641
(1978); B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979).
155. Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 117 Misc. 2d 929, 459 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1982).
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care. 156 Although these fact patterns fit comfortably into the immedi-
ately preceeding discussion, these cases emphasize an interest different
from the contorts cases. The promisor's conduct may or may not be
culpable. Culpability may influence the judge or jury relative to the
amount of the award, but it is not relevant in establishing a right to
damages. Instead, these cases turn on the expectation of the parties,
the nonpecuniary nature of the exchange, and the attribution of
knowledge to the promisor that emotional distress will accompany
breach. The nonpecuniary basis of exchange and the motivation for
contracting constitute the heart of liability. The promisor is being
held liable for failure to deliver what was promised.
E. The Liability Rule
I offer a modest rule of liability which does little more than re-
verse the presumption against damages for this class of cases: Dam-
ages for nonpecuniary losses are to be awarded for breach of contract
when the parties enter into a bargain which has as its principal function
the exchange of a nonpecuniary interest. I concentrate on the simple
one-sided exchange in which money is given in return for goods or
services intended to bring emotional satisfaction rather than monetary
gain.
Clearly, people enter into contracts with mixed motives. Some-
one may purchase an objet d'art for emotional reasons as well as an
investment. The inquiry relative to imposing liability for disappoint-
ment turns on risk allocation. An art dealer may sell and a collector
may buy the object as an investment in one case. Any aesthetic disap-
pointment suffered by the collector goes uncompensated because the
function of the contract as an investment was pecuniary. In another
case, an artist may be commissioned to paint and a client may con-
tract to buy a portrait for aesthetic satisfaction. The artist should be
held liable for disappointment damages in the appropriate situation
such as when the artist assures the client that the work will be satis-
factory. Before liability is imposed, a finding, albeit imperfect, must
be made about the allocation of emotional risks. This finding is gener-
ally made implicitly in most cases. This rule forces an explicit finding.
What is novel about this liability rule is the assertion that the rule is
justified on contracts analysis independent of torts.
The cases granting relief have specific elements in common and
156. Guerin v. New Hampshire Catholic Charities, 418 A.2d 224 (N.H. 1980) (claim allowed
over dismissal).
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provide a foundation for a liability rule. First, the primary purpose of
the bargain, particularly from the promisee's vantage point, is emo-
tional satisfaction.' 57 Second, the promisor knows this and expressly
or implicitly accepts the risk that breach will cause emotional harm.
While it is true that these are personal injuries, the promisee's expec-
tations are not subjective in a secretive sense. The promisor knows or
should know that nonpecuniary interests are the primary motivation
for the promisee to enter the contract. In fact, the promisor holds
himself or herself out as someone whose business it is to satisfy those
needs-they often advertise this very fact. Third, the promisee fre-
quently pays a premium for the service. The promisee, for example,
who sends film to a discount developer for fast service assumes the
risk of having the film lost or destroyed. The risk of loss passes to the
photography studio assuring the promisee that the film will be pro-
tected. Fourth, the promisee directly suffers nonpecuniary injuries as
a result of breach. These injuries stem either from the promisee's reli-
ance on the contract or from the promisee's frustrated expectation.
Most often, these are the only injuries the promisee suffers; there may
be no significant pecuniary losses. The vacation is ruined, the wed-
ding pictures are lost, the reception is a disaster, in a word, the
dreams are shattered. The promisee's bargained for expectations are
not realized and in most cases are not realizable. The lost remains are
forever gone. The failure of the doctor to comfort a patient in time of
need, comfort bargained for as an integral part of the contract, cannot
be rendered, and the haute couture original cannot be properly fitted
for the debutante ball. Therefore, if the promisee is denied recovery
on the nonpecuniary claim, he or she goes uncompensated. To return
the cost of the film' 58 or to return a downpayment for wedding musi-
cians ' 59 is a nominal award at best; it is also an insult. Finally, the
most significant aspect of these cases is that they are better described
as nonmarket transactions.
"Nonmarket transaction" is used in two ways. First, a transac-
tion is a nonmarket transaction when no market exists in which trades
can be made to establish the price of the promisee's expectation. Even
though these contracts are traditional bargained-for-exchanges in
which the promisee pays a sum certain in exchange for emotional
gratification, only the price on the promisor's side of the transaction is
157. Bolla, supra note 69, at 562-67; Veitch, supra note 71, at 235.
158. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979).
159. Dietsch v. Music Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 453 N.E.2d 1302 (1983).
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established in a market. There is no market, for example, for a set of
slides of Uncle Bill's trip to Borneo. Second, even if a market exists
for the purpose of pricing the value of the promisor's goods or serv-
ices (i.e., Uncle Bill had several photography studios to choose from
initially) once the slides are destroyed, the time has passed for that
market to have any usefulness to the promisee. °60 Although prior to
entering the contract a market existed where the promisee could shop
around for substitute goods or performance, once breach occurs there
are no markets for substitutes. Any market existing prior to the con-
tract has collapsed-market alternatives are no longer available. The
economic value of the ice sculpture centerpiece for a promisee's wed-
ding is capable of being measured, but the measurement bears no rela-
tion to the amount and types of damages claimed which is the
disappointment promisee suffered. 61
There are economic, moral, and political arguments for establish-
ing a liability rule permitting a contracts cause of action and awarding
damages for nonpecuniary harms. Although these arguments are not
discrete, they are distinctive enough to deserve separate treatment.
The liability issue is addressed here, and later similar arguments will
be made for a damages remedy supporting the liability rule.
Economic Argument. The economic basis of contracts 162 asserts
that contracts are and should be enforced because they contribute to a
productive society, 63 are wealth maximizing, 164 and that these goals
are consistent with and supportive of individual liberty interests in-
herent in the concept of freedom of contract. 65 These arguments
160. As a first step it is imperative that the contract be defined. If the contract is one for
developing slides of Borneo that have special value, then these special damages should be recovered
because they are the basis of the contract. Not so for a contract that is interpreted as being just for
the development of film. In this instance, only general damages are awarded.
161. The ice sculpture may be worth $100 (the cost represents the sculptor's contract price),
but the damages for the disappointment in not having the centerpiece may be more or less. There is
no mechanical way to calculate promisee's disappointment. Promisee may not even have noticed
that the sculpture was missing in which case no damages are due. Or promisee may have suffered
$125 of nonpecuniary injuries. The precise calculation is a jury determination. See infra text accom-
panying notes 201-11.
162. See generally supra notes 4 & 24; Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of
Contract, J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
163. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1265-66.
164. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudica-
tion, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Coleman, supra note 28.
165. A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, supra note 4, at ch. 7.
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look at law from a specific place. As ex ante arguments, 166 their pri-
mary purpose is to foster future social gains rather than allocate the
costs of past individual disputes. The economic vision takes as its
starting place the ideal that contracts law rules should further a mar-
ket economy.
Although economic analysis can be criticized, 67 it does not un-
dercut a liability rule for nonpecuniary injuries for two reasons. First,
because economic arguments are most powerful and have their great-
est application where strong markets exist, they are only partially ap-
posite to the nonmarket transactions under consideration. 68 The
economic functioning of contracts depends on workable, competitive
markets, where parties can bargain fairly, where prices are accurately
set, and where goods and services are allocated to their highest
uses.169 The advancement of economic goals dissipates when the mar-
ket thins.170 Second, the economic basis supports an efficient compen-
sation principle when bargained for expectations are not satisfied.
When bargained for expectations are not satisfied in nonmarket trans-
actions, the promisee generally goes uncompensated or undercompen-
sated. Therefore, economic analysis should support compensation
rather than encourage waste.
The chief characteristic of these nonmarket transactions is that
when the market collapses the promisee's substitute choices are fore-
closed. Once the promisor breaches, even assuming the promisor
competed in a vital market in which there were many competitors for
the promisee's contract, the promisor effectively becomes a monopo-
list. Once the contract is made, the promisor, after either creating the
promisee's reasonable expectations or after procuring the promisee's
reasonable reliance, controls what has become a limited or unique
market. 7 1 One of the economic functions of the promise is to pro-
duce a state of affairs upon which the parties rely so the promisee can
166. See, eg., Feinman, supra note 5, at 842-44; Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1745-51; Unger,
supra note 5, at 606-648; Gabel & Feinman, supra note 5.
167. See, eg., Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 711 (1980); Sagoff, At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima or Why Political Questions are Not All
Economic, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 1283 (1981); Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice,
1979 Wisc. L. REv. 799 (1979); Kennedy, supra note 5; Unger, supra note 5; Feinman, supra note 5
and supra note 29.
168. Goetz & Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obliga-
tion, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 969 (1983).
169. See Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 746-48.
170. Goetz & Scott, supra note 168, at 1011.
171. Williamson, supra note 45, at 241.
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plan and adapt behavior.1 72 When the promisor's behavior causes the
promisee's injury, the costs of the broken promise should be borne by
the person responsible for foreclosing the opportunities of the prom-
isee who has no market to turn to for alternate performance. Once
the promisor breaches the contract, the promisee has no opportunity
to mitigate. There is generally no opportunity to modify the contract
voluntarily because the promisee is a captive. There is no opportunity
to purchase substitute goods or services. Thus, the compensation ra-
tionale behind the theory of efficient breach is inapposite.1 73
Denying recovery to the injured promisee means that the prom-
isee suffers lost opportunity costs or incurs reliance expenditures
while having no real way to protect against these losses. It is easier
for the merchant-promisor to insure against business risks than it is
for the nonmerchant promisee to absorb this type of transaction
cost. 174 It is inefficient to require the promisee to protect herself or
himself by arranging for duplicate substitute performance, because
such self-protection means that the promisee must tie up another sup-
plier on the contingency that the first promisor will breach. Further,
loss sharing 75 is inappropriate when the promisor exercises extraordi-
nary market control. After all, the injuries come about as a result of
the promisor's fault and at the promisee's expense. Any imposition of
loss sharing encourages opportunistic behavior by the promisor.176
Liability should be imposed on promisors because they control the
market once the contract is made. They are in a position to prevent
loss by performing. They accept the risk as a basic element of the
contractual exchange.
Moral Argument. The moral argument approaches contract law
from an individualistic standpoint.177 Promises ought to be enforced
because they advance individual goals of trust, liberty, and responsi-
172. Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1267-69.
173. The theory holds that efficient breach occurs and should be encouraged when A can
breach a contract with B and sell to C at a price sufficiently above the contract price to compensate B
for B's losses and still profit. For a critique of the theory, see Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract:
Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982).
174. The consumer most likely will not be in a position to buy insurance except at an exorbi-
tant cost because there is no such market for insurance in disappointed dreams. Contrariwise, a
merchant can purchase business risk insurance and have the costs of that insurance reflected in the
price. See, e.g., Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 336
(1983).
175. Id. at 319, 338.
176. Goetz & Scott, supra note 168, at 1011.
177. J. RAwLs, supra note 9, at 344-48.
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bility.' 78 Social goals are advanced as a consequence because individ-
uals are encouraged to collaborate to further mutual interests thereby
fostering a sense of community. The moral basis of contracts is
viewed from a deontological Kantian perspective as distinguished
from the teleological utilitarian approach of economic analysis.
While the concern of economic analysis is social efficiency, the touch-
stone of the moral argument is individual fairness.
In a recent article, Professor Robert Hillman sets out four "fair-
ness norms" for contracts rules: The party with the greater equities
should be favored; a party should not knowingly harm another with-
out justification; a party should act reasonably to avoid harming itself;
and, each party should benefit from an agreement roughly according
to the contract allocation.' 79 The fairness norms start with individu-
alistic premises. Society will benefit to the extent individual freedom
and liberty advance.
A liability rule for nonpecuniary harms neatly satisfies these four
norms. First, the equities are with the promisee who is in no position
to protect himself or herself after he or she has relied on the assur-
ances of the promisor. The promisor, the breaching party, can avoid
the imposition of harm more easily by either honoring the contract,
insuring against the risk, or paying compensation for the nonpecu-
niary harms caused. The promisor can then either absorb the loss or
spread it by reflecting it in future prices. Second, the reported opin-
ions are almost completely absent of reasons justifying breach. The
basic defense offered by the promisor is not excuse such as mistake,
impossibility, waiver, or changed circumstances. Rather, it is the bold
assertion that damages are generally not allowed and should not be
allowed in the instant case. Third, once the contract is made, promis-
ees are in no position to avoid harming themselves. They bargained
for mental or emotional satisfaction which is destroyed because of
breach, and breach usually comes too late to do anything about it.
Finally, unless compensation is made, the allocation of risk is skewed
against the nonbreaching promisee, and the promisor escapes liability
for a contracted for risk, thus fostering unacceptable behavior.
The value of the contract to the promisee is idiosyncratic.180 Be-
178. C. FRIED, supra note 3, at 7-27.
179. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 617,
619, 629-39 (1983).
180. Williamson, supra note 45, at 233, 238-45. Williamson argues that the market does not
function to govern contractual relationships in idiosyncratic transactions. Rather, "'Other things
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cause the market does not offer a substitute, contracts law should sup-
port a cause of action in nonmarket situations based on a moral or
fairness approach.""' This rationale is the basis of specific perform-
ance orders.1 82 In contracts for unique goods, for example, specific
performance is uniformly granted to enforce the promised perform-
ance. By imposing liability, the promisee receives the benefit of the
bargain, a benefit within the contemplation of the parties. Therefore,
the motivations of both parties are recognized and honored.
Political Argument. There is a point of convergence between the
moral and economic bases of the law of contracts. The width and
depth of the convergence is not precise, but it is significant. From an
economic view, liability and damage rules ought to promote market
transactions 183 because individuals as a whole advance when social
gains are optimally realized. From a moral basis, promises ought to
be enforced because it is morally good to do so since the law respects
the dignity of persons, and this is conducive to a community of trust.
In other words, moral and economic arguments each contain a certain
perspective or worldview about how individuals and society interact.
Each worldview proposes a way to mediate conflicts between individ-
ual interests and collective goals. These are political/ideological posi-
tions. The value of political discourse lies in pointing out how
ideology operates in the legal system by more fully developing the
normative consequences of specific legal positions.
The liberal ideological position is that contracts law can mediate
individual/social conflicts and can best do so through a method of
reflective doctrinal analysis. The method works by refined analysis of
existing contracts rules and principles. Refined analysis of the cases
under discussion leads to a distinction between market and
nonmarket transactions. The market/nonmarket distinction is used
to develop contracts law more fully with the hope of making law more
just by mediating conflicting interests. In market situations, individ-
ual and social interests operate consistently according to economic
norms. The parties know that one of the rules of the market game is
that if you breach you pay and that the amount of payment can be
being equal, idiosyncratic exchange relations which feature personal trust will survive greater stress
and display greater adaptability." Id. at 240-41.
181. Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity and the Second Re-
statement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 112 (1981).
182. Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); Kronman, Spe-
cific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978); Linzer, supra note 181.
183. M. POLINSKY, supra note 4; but see Macneil, supra note 173.
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ascertained before breach with fair accuracy. 184 In nonmarket trans-
actions, however, collective and individual interests must be accom-
modated to a new situation. Instead of concentrating on maximizing
value, individual contractual transactions are scrutinized in an at-
tempt to assess moral fairness over economic efficiency.
Not so curiously, the legal rules remain relatively stable. If you
breach, you pay. Only in nonmarket situations the amount is uncer-
tain. As a matter of policy and institutional integrity, it makes sense
to keep the rules consistent. Let parties bargain and allocate risks
voluntarily. Just because some promises contain more uncertainty
than others, the liability rules should not be relaxed to the point of
allowing breaching parties to escape contractual liability. Parties
should be held to their assumed obligations.18 5 By imposing liability
for breach in nonpecuniary transactions, individual/social interests of
substantive fairness are advanced because the parties are held respon-
sible for their promises.18 6 The injured party is compensated at the
expense of the party causing the harm. Further, social/individual in-
terests of efficiency are acknowledged by imposing transaction costs
on the promisor who is in a better position to absorb the costs. The
thrust of the political argument is to mediate (and, if possible, recon-
cile) conflicts between individuals and society.
It should be noted that the class of cases will remain relatively
small. Every broken promise has some emotional fallout. But every
such promisee is not entitled to compensation for this item of dam-
ages.187 Every consumer transaction causing inconvenience will not
lead to the imposition of damages on merchants. 8 8 Liability will be
184. See, e.g., 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 233-40 (1963).
185. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981).
186. See Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. RaV.
1365, 1373-74 (1982).
187. See Veitch, supra note 71, at 235-26. He warns of a floodgate of litigation: "Therefore
once intangible harm has been accepted as an independent compensable harm there can be no logical
restriction on the kind of situations in which it will be recognized." Id. at 236.
The logical restriction is that most consumer transactions, the purchase of a toaster for exam-
ple, are market transactions where breach should occasion little emotional harm and no liability for
such damages. Even if an extremely sensitive promisee has an anxiety attack because the toaster did
not function, no damages should be awarded because these special circumstances are not part of the
bargain, they are not within the contemplation of the parties, and risk for emotional harm is allo-
cated to the consumer. At the other extreme, the consumer who is remodelling a kitchen which is to
be the showpiece of the house does have a legitimate right to expect emotional satisfaction because
that is an integral part of the bargain.
188. Few cases brought under the Uniform Commercial Code would request such damages,
for example, because these are intended by both parties as pecuniary transactions. However, in the
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imposed only in those transactions in which the promisor's chief stock
in trade is the sale of emotional satisfaction. The promisee willingly
pays for emotional security, and risk is allocated to the assuring
promisor accordingly. The consumer who purchases jeans off the
rack presents a case categorically different from the consumer who
negotiates a designer original for an inaugural ball. While emotional
damages should be ignored in the first example, it is wrong to deny
them in the second. A liability rule sensitive to this fundamental dif-
ference should award damages. 189
IV. CONTRACTUAL REMEDY FOR NONPECUNIARY INJURIES
A. Limited Range of Remedies
The function of a remedy is to vindicate a right.190 The linkage
between right and remedy is forged most strongly when reasons sup-
porting the liability rule are consistent with and supportive of the re-
medial measure. Contracts remedies are skewed toward protecting
social economic interests and consequently downplay personal inter-
ests. This is not an argument against protecting commercial interests
or suggesting that economic criteria are inappropriate to contracts
law. Rather, the protection of commercial interests and the advance-
ment of economic goals are desirable in the proper classification of
contractual transactions. Contract remedies, purportedly for reasons
of efficiency, discount disappointment in calculating damages explic-
itly and effectively. Once discounted, the injured promisee is fre-
quently remediless. This discounting should not take place wholesale.
Contracts law should be sensitive to different contractual transac-
tions. It is unfair and maybe inefficient to deny the promisee relief in
nonmarket transactions. 191
The most effective and prominent contracts remedy is a measure
of money designed to compensate the promisee for lost expectations.
proper cases they can be awarded under U.C.C. § 2-714 or § 2-715. See Hirst v. Elgin Metal Casket
Co., 438 F. Supp. 906 (D. Mont. 1977) (siblings granted damages for emotional distress when casket
leaked); Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 117 Misc. 2d 929, 459 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Ct. 1982);
Woodward v. Naylor Motor Sales, 14 U.C.C. Reptr. Serv. 1269 (Dist. Ct. Mich. 1974) (damages
denied for breach of warranty in sale of car).
189. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 168, at 1004; Kronman, Contract Law and Distribu-
tive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
190. Ubijus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. D. DOBBS, supra note
100, §§ 1.1-1.2; Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) ("The function of a
remedy is to 'realize' a legal norm, to make it a 'living truth.' ").
191. But see Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1982).
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Expectancy damages should be allowed in breaches of nonmarket
contracts because the rationales behind both the liability rule and the
remedial measure support each other. Both rationales are based on a
rejection of the market as the measuring rod. The market must be
side stepped because it does not operate effectively to vindicate the
right to compensation for lost expectations.
Most of the traditional range of contract remedies (specific per-
formance, reliance, rescission, and restitution) must be disregarded
because they provide no compensation. Specific performance cannot
be ordered to restore lost pictures, to bury the deceased properly, to
reconstruct a dream house,1 92 or to offer an alternate vacation. Per-
formance after the fact does not relieve the disappointment and dis-
tress occasioned by breach. Specific performance cannot accomplish
the nonpecuniary purpose of the contract. Therefore, it is an ineffec-
tive remedy. Reliance damages do not address the basis of liability
either. In many cases, the promisee goes through with the contract
anyway. The funeral is performed, the wedding takes place, and the
house is accepted. In each case, the promisee receives less than they
expected and less than the promisor promised. The promisee ex-
pected peace of mind, a felicitous wedding, or a dream home-none
of which was delivered. The function of reliance damages is to place
the injured party into the precontract position by compensating for
losses that would not have occurred but for the contract.1 93 An
award of reliance damages when the promisee has performed misses
the nature of the claim for nonpecuniary damages. Recission is
equally ineffective because the harm has already occurred. Likewise,
restitution is inappropriate. Returning a deposit for a band that never
played at a wedding reception does not reflect compensation for the
distress caused because the promisee received a less than hoped for
affair.194 Therefore, the remaining contractual remedy is expectation
damages-a choice not free from difficulties of its own.
192. If the Contractor has not substantially performed then the Home Owner is excused from
performance. However, where the Contractor has substantially performed the Home Owner is not
excused from performance. Nevertheless, the disappointment in not having the promised dream
house remains. If the Home Owner chooses to perform and purchases the home, it is likely that,
given the facts of the hypothetical, a court will not order reconstruction in an effort to avoid eco-
nomic waste.
193. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 7.
194. Deitsch v. Music Co., 6 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 453 N.E.2d 1302 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct.
1983).
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B. Damages Measures
There are several mechanical formulas for measuring expectancy
damages in breach of contract cases. Unfortunately, most formulas
hew too narrowly to contract price as the basis of the award. None of
the basic formulas works well for these cases. Some suggest conve-
nient rules of thumb, nevertheless all are deficient because they are
keyed to the existence of a market. The only way to assess damages
for nonpecuniary losses in these cases is to send the issue to the fact-
finder with proper instructions.195
Contract Price. The simplest measurement is the contract price.
It can be used either as a maximum amount of recovery or a mini-
mum, and it has a superficial attractiveness. Contract price appears
to be the value of the contract because it looks like the value which
the parties assigned to its performance.1 96 However, the price reflects
only the monetary value of the promisor's goods or services. The ex-
plicit quid pro quo in these exchanges is that the promisor gives serv-
ices and assurances to the promisee who, in turn, gives money and
trust foregoing other opportunities. A photographer agrees to take
pictures of the birth of a couple's first child for fifty dollars. The
amount represents the value of services to the photographer. It also
represents the photographer's competitive position in the market.
The couple is bargaining for photographs of the delivery of their first
child in order to capture the beauty of the moment. The value to the
couple is not monetizable.
In a market with numerous traders, a homogenous commodity,
cost-free information, and participants with a small market share,1 97
contract price may be the most efficient way to allow the proper allo-
cation and distribution of goods. Therefore, it is justifiable to limit
damages to contract price. But this does not describe these cases.
The market existing in order for the photographer to set prices was
only one-sided-it worked for the promisor and worked for the prom-
isee to pick and choose initially. But once the moment of contracting
passes and once breach occurs, the market collapses and substitutes
195. See infra text accompanying notes 201-11. Proper instructions would require the jury to
find that the primary motivation for entering the contract was nonpecuniary and that the promisor
knew or should have known that. The evidence to support this comes from the nature of the trans-
action, the relationship of the parties, what was expressly said or written, and the type of evidence
introduced for purposes of interpretation.
196. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 745.
197. Id. at 746-48.
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are not available. The photographer's status has changed from a com-
petitor to a monopolist who dominates the couple.
Contract price is inappropriate as either a ceiling or a floor. The
promisee is claiming damages for mental distress not damages for the
value of the goods and services. The exchange is one between pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary items. The primary motivation of the couple
was happiness which they valued differently from the fifty dollars they
were willing to pay. Otherwise, no exchange would have taken
place.19 8 The couple's damages may be greater or lesser than the con-
tract price depending on how the jury or judge reacts to the evidence.
Contract price does not reflect the whole bargain of the parties. It
reflects the promisor's costs (including profits and insurance) not the
expectations of the promisee. In market transactions, the contract
price is the acknowledged value of the expectation, because money is
exchanged for goods or services valued in a market. In nonmarket
transactions, the product being exchanged for money cannot be exter-
nally valued.
Market Value. Market value is inappropriate because, like con-
tract price, it only partially reflects the value of the bargain. The
more the promisor can reduce costs and the more competitive the
contract price is with market price, the more profits the promisor
makes. Market value is a baseline for determining the promisor's
profits. The promisee, however, has no interest in market profits.
The couple, for example, could not resell these photographs in any
recognizable market. Indeed, if that were their proven motivation,
their claim for nonpecuniary damages would fail. Their special dam-
ages are not lost resale profits, their special damages are lost memo-
ries. To award them the market value of the photographer's services
bears no relation to the idiosyncratic value they bargained for in ex-
change for fifty dollars. Neither the cost of lost film' 99 nor the pho-
tographer's services was intended to be equivalent to the sentimental
value of the pictures. The couple was willing to part with fifty dollars,
because the recordation of memories was more valuable to them.
Diminution in Market Value. The classic measure of expectancy
damages is the difference between contract price and market price.
198. Yorio, supra note 186, at 1390-91. It is conceivable that they value the services for less
than $50 either because they are economically irrational bargainers or instead of a regular delivery,
the child was delivered by ceasarean section that neither parent cared to have on film in which case
the couple would be overcompensated if contract price were used as a minimum.
199. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979).
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The use of this formula, however, only compounds the dislocation in
the exchange between pecuniary and nonpecuniary promises. This
formula is also a rough way of calculating the profits the promisor
intended from the transaction. However, the promisee is not out to
make profits in a monetary sense.
Each of these measures depends on the existence of a market.
Each implicitly assumes that a goal of contracts damages is to further
competitive markets and that promisors and promisees are similarly
motivated. These formulas appear attractive because they are conve-
nient measures providing a degree of certainty, but they do not corre-
spond with the nature of the liability interest being addressed. The
promisee's expectation interests are not capable of being quantified
and cannot be set by a market; another more subjective mechanism to
set compensation must be used.2°° Since mechanical formulas do not
work, damages must be set by a judge or jury. This increases the
economic uncertainty of these contracts, and the promisor is going to
have to bear that uncertainty.
C. Judicial Determination
Cases awarding damages for injury to nonpecuniary interests
must resort to the less than scientific and somewhat unsophisticated
method of the judicial guess.201 Because parties openly negotiate for
the satisfaction of the promisee's emotional desires and market-based
remedial measures do not reflect the bargain, damages must be deter-
mined either by judge or jury. The contract price or market value can
be a starting place but cannot be the limit because, as one court said,
that would be illogical.202 The use of the judicial guess to set expec-
tancy damages, time tested in torts cases, can be justified with eco-
200. Goetz & Scott, supra note 162, at 569-70.
201. Veitch, supra note 71, at 240; Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 748-50 and passim to 785; Bolla,
supra 69, at 572.
202. Harris v. Waikane Corp., 484 F. Supp. 372, 381 (D. Hawaii 1980) (contract price of
vacation package $3000 judge awarded $4800):
Another important factor is the total contract price-three thousand dollars. This figure
helps the court value the charter as a whole. The amount the plaintiffs were paying for the
charter clearly bears some relation to the value they put on it.
One final factor is that the plaintiff might have accepted the Waikane offer of the two
substitute yachts. . . [T]his is another indication of the value the plaintiffs placed [on the
contract].
All these factors are relevant. The Court is not going pretend to logically fit them all
together into a completed jigsaw puzzle that spells out a particular dollar figure. Such
precision is impossible in most cases, but is especially difficult here given the ethereal, yet
real, nature of some of the items of damages.
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nomic, moral, and political arguments coinciding with the arguments
used to develop the liability rule.
Economic Argument. The liability rule recognizes that no mar-
ket exists to find substitutes for emotional distress and that some rem-
edy should be available to protect the promisee's expectations. The
catalogue of remedies, however, is rapidly depleted leaving only a less
than certain jury determination of expectancy damages rather than
setting damages by more rigid formulas. Most contract remedies are
designed to promote commercial transactions20 3 and are based on an
economic vision of what contracts remedies should do.204 Commer-
cial transactions are facilitated and a credit economy is advanced
when remedies rules are certain, predictable, and objective. People
can rely on this information to plan, risks are reduced, and more risk-
averse traders can enter the marketplace. 20 5
Such norms, however, cannot operate in nonmarket situations in
which parties bargain over a nonpecuniary exchange, monetary value
is indeterminate on one side of the exchange, and risk is nevertheless
allocated. The need for commercial certainty is weakened in favor of
honoring the bargain made by the parties when only the promisor's
performance is the price given in exchange.20 6 The value of the con-
tract to the promisee is not fixed with as much certainty as the price
of the promisor's performance. The issue then becomes: Who should
bear the uncertainty costs?
When nonmarket contracts are breached, an uncertain monetary
value attaches to the promisee's loss. Because the market has ceased
to function, competitive pricing as a goal assumes less importance.
Competitive pricing operates in establishing a price going into the
contract; it does not further competition once the contract is made
and then breached. Likewise, the accuracy of price signals and the
efficiency of the allocation of promisor's goods or services become sec-
ondary. Moreover, the promisor exercises greater control over cir-
cumstances giving rise to nonperformance. There are two alternative
arguments to support an uncertain damages award in these cases.
203. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 750.
204. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 CoLUM. L. Rav. 1145, 1215-16
(1970); but see Farber, supra note 100, at 339: "The picture that begins to emerge from these newer
theories is that of a world in which market transactions are only one among a group of important
economic institutions."
205. Veitch, supra note 71, at 242.
206. Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 741.
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First, it may very well be economically efficient to do so. Second,
efficiency analysis might be sacrificed.
The efficiency argument is that promisors have voluntarily ac-
cepted this particular risk. In accepting this risk, they should have
calculated, however roughly, the costs associated with the risks in set-
ting their prices for the goods or services promised. Prices are set in a
market in which all similar promisors are similarly situated. Even
though the costs of the risk are uncertain, uncertainty is part of the
promisor's calculations, and the promisor bargained for the uncer-
tainty.20 7 It must be recalled that the promisee usually pays a pre-
mium for the services. Hiring a limousine service to take someone to
an airport to catch a plane costs more than a taxi cab because, among
other things, the risks to the limousine service are greater. The pre-
mium reflects the assurances of satisfaction given to the promisee by
the promisor. More likely, it is easier for the promisor to insure
against risk with some line of business insurance than it is for the
promisee to purchase insurance against the failure to obtain emotional
satisfaction. 20 8
Similarly, it is unwise to have the promisee plan against the con-
tingency of breach by arranging for a substitute promisor. This con-
tingency planning has the effect of tying up the production of two
promisor's when only one is needed to satisfy the promisee. Imposing
contingency planning costs on the promisee also ignores the fact that
the promisee has already paid the promisor's insurance costs by pay-
ing a premium for the promisor's assurances. It is inefficient and un-
fair to have the promisee pay twice. It is also likely that the promisee
is in less of a position to secure information about the promisor's abil-
ity to perform. Even assuming that no one will know if the agreement
will be breached, the promisor is in a superior position to control the
promised performance. To move the uncertainty of performance and
the uncertain risk from promisor to promisee by imposing informa-
tion acquisition or insurance or other self-protection costs on promis-
ees discourages promisees from engaging in nonmarket contracts.
207. Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REV. 132 (1981). Imposing uncertainty
costs on the promisor seems initially attractive and fair. However, the "effects of uncertainty" are
not uniform. Some promisors will over comply and others undercomply. A consequence of over
compliance may be under compensation to some promises and the creation of a social externality.
Likewise, the consequence of undercompliance may be over compensation to other promisees. See
Calfee & Croswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance With Legal Standards, 70 VA. L.
RE. 965 (1984).
208. Rea, supra note 191.
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Similarly, such a move promotes opportunistic behavior by the prom-
isor who is in a better position to absorb these losses. The promisor
can spread the loss in future prices, more carefully draft contracts,
fairly advertise, or honestly represent his or her goods or services.
Such costs are the costs of doing business, and these costs are reflected
in the market place. The costs, as reflected in prices, also signal
which promisors are reliable. The more damage awards imposed
upon welching promisors, the higher their prices, and inefficient
promisors will be driven from the market.
Further, there is something surreal in talking about market ef-
fects when the market bursts. Promisees enter these contracts for
emotional gratification, and promisors assure them of its delivery.
They are willing to pay a price in exchange for delivery of a good or
service which brings gratification. If promisees enter contracts with
the idea that they must bear the economic costs of breach, then the
transaction has been transformed from a nonpecuniary into a pecuni-
ary one thereby subverting the promisees' very reasons for entering
into the transaction. A Belmontine community has turned into a Ve-
netian market.
Alternatively, economic efficiency analysis can be suspended in
nonmarket transactions because there is little or no allocation func-
tion when goods and services are highly specialized. Further, the bar-
gaining status of the parties has been completely altered after breach.
The promisee can no longer shop around in the market. These eco-
nomic arguments20 9 are based less on efficiency and wealth maximiza-
tion than on the allocation of transaction costs to the promisor and on
the compensation of lost opportunity costs to the injured promisee.
Moral Argument. There is no bright line between many of the
economic arguments and the fairness arguments. The assumption be-
hind the economic arguments is that certain costs should be allocated
to the breaching promisor because it is fair to do so. This sense of
fairness turns on the innocence of the promisee and on the fault of the
promisor. It is fair to assess damages to the promisor, even damages
which are uncertain in amount, because it is the only viable remedy
remaining and because it offends a sense of justice to leave the prom-
209. But see id.. Rea argues that maximum compensation for nonpecuniary injuries does not
advance consumer efficiency. He assumes, however, that the monetary value of the emotional dam-
ages is known or knowable. I proceed on the assumption that it is uncertain and will remain so and
that the only mechanism to overcome the uncertainty is ajudge-made verdict or jury award. I find it
difficult to understand how noncompensation, the alternative, benefits consumers.
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isee injured when risks were voluntarily allocated. Damages are flexi-
ble enough 210 to compensate and lay blame when a case warrants
assessing fault for wrongful conduct. Still, the idea is first to make the
promisee whole, then to lay blame.
Damages are also flexible enough to compensate promisees for
either the severity of the emotional distress or for a slight annoyance
neither of which bears a relation to the contract or market price. In
other words, it is wrong to assume that damages for nonpecuniary
harms always will be greatly in excess of the market price or contract
price. If the promisor can prove the wedding party did not miss the
musicians until their absence was noted after the reception, the prom-
isee's claim evaporates. Costs are imposed on the responsible party,
and protection is awarded to the party injured.
A damages remedy is consistent with the liability principle be-
cause the award is keyed to the nature of the breach. The reason the
promisor was held liable was because he or she accepted a risk and
reneged on a promise. The award measures the value of the risk
knowingly allocated to the promisor even though its exact measure-
ment is uncertain.
Political Argument. The strongest political argument is that the
damages remedy accommodates the societal-efficiency vision of the
economic argument and the individualist-fairness view of the moral
argument. If the economic and moral arguments are accepted, which
they should be, then individual and collective interests are satisfied.
Another test of the soundness of the political argument is how well
the new rule advances contractual goals. First, the remedy of expec-
tancy damages is coordinated with the promisor's liability for failing
to deliver the promised dream. The liability and remedial rules are
thus compatible. The coalescence of right and remedy attests to the
law's legitimacy. Second, the rules are identifiable. Parties can con-
tract for emotional satisfaction knowing their expectations will be
honored rather than disregarded. Third, a gap left by assigning these
cases to torts is closed by providing a contracts cause of action. After
the gap is closed, the artificial separation of torts and contracts can be
disregarded. The torts side of these cases focuses on coercing socially
acceptable behavior and by punishing bad conduct, while the con-
tracts side protects the expectations of promisees. This shoring up of
the realm of contorts means that lawyers should be better able to ad-
210. Hillman, supra note 179, at 620; Goetz & Scott, supra note 162, at 569-70; Yorio, supra
note 186, at 1367-74, 1415-16.
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vise clients and that judges should be better able to decide cases recog-
nizing that there are different interests to protect.
A clear rule of contractual liability, even when coupled with an
uncertain damages award, provides better signals to promisors. They
will be in a position to protect themselves by better use of liquidated
damages provisions, more explicit contracts, more truthful advertis-
ing, or insurance.21I These signals should offer greater legitimacy to
the contracting process by leaving fewer promisees uncompensated.
Finally, reflective doctrinal analysis was used to reform a confused
area of law, refine contracts law by recognizing the market/
nonmarket distinction, and reconcile competing values.
V. CONCLUSION
In the world of contracts law, the nonpecuniary harm problem is
small. The cases are few, and the dollar amounts involved are not
significant.212 Generally, these cases are too costly to litigate, and
there will be no rush to the courthouse to vindicate the right to dam-
ages for loss of emotional satisfaction. But, then, the significance of
this discussion lies elsewhere. These cases do exist, and the story they
tell about contracts law is revealing. Currrently, they are inade-
quately handled by contracts law. The premise of this Article is that
these cases are essentially contractual in nature and that contracts law
is sufficiently rich to accommodate these claims. It is not the point of
this argument to take these cases away from torts nor to deny the
overlap. Rather, it is to assert that contracts law is a rich discipline
not limited to market-based transactions. There are different interests
to be protected arising from nonmarket situations, and contracts law
currently does not provide proper protection.
More ambitiously, the discussion of nonpecuniary liability and of
its corresponding remedy suggests a theory about contracts law in
nonmarket transactions. The central idea is that contracts law should
provide a more fully developed theory for nonmarket or defective
market transactions. People enter contractual relationships with their
families or between friends and find themselves in specialized relation-
ships in which market-based theories assume secondary importance at
211. Naturally, these cases must confront the issue of bargaining equality and inequality. Un-
conscionable provisions, such as undercompensatory liquidated damages clauses, or excessive dis-
claimers should offer no more problems to promisor. See, eg, Bogner v. General Motors Corp., 117
Misc. 2d 929, 459 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Ct. 1982).
212. See, eg., Veitch, supra note 71, at 240-42.
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best. Of what economic moment is it, for example, to the rank-and-
file of a labor union who, because of institutional and structural re-
straints, are part of a collective bargaining agreement which they had
little or no meaningful participation in formulating? Of what effi-
ciency significance is it when clients contract with lawyers or patients
with physicians? What is the wealth maximizing interest of a health
insurance policy holder who receives the insurance as part of a bene-
fits package in an employment agreement? Where is the market and
what are the exchange values of antenuptual agreements? Because of
superior knowledge and specialized expertise or because of bargaining
advantage, many parties to contracts are bargaining not for direct pe-
cuniary gain but for nonpecuniary satisfactions such as the right to
participate in decisionmaking, the opportunity to express themselves,
or the chance to exercise their voice in matters affecting them as indi-
viduals rather than as economic units.
This discussion of a more developed contracts law also connects
with other developments in the law of contracts. The expansion of
the remedy of specific performance213 and the imposition of liability in
cases of unconscionability or other market dislocations require a con-
tracts theory starting from within the contractual relationship. A re-
fined contracts law recognizes the subleties of relationships and then
moves outward toward beneficial social arrangements and institutions
instead of starting with a social vision whose main goal is to replicate
a market economy. We live in a heavily market-oriented society, and
contracts law is and should be responsive to that world. We also live
in a society in which the institution of the promise has deep meaning
for reasons independent of the short term pecuniary gains at the heart
of market analyses.
The change in the rule regarding nonpecuniary harms towards a
presumption of liability, together with a damages remedy accepting a
greater degree of uncertainty, is consistent with this developing period
of contracts law.214 The change is suggestive of a move away from a
contracts law ideology embodying an idealized version of a nineteenth
century market economy valuing objective, certain, and predictable
rules that are economically useful. 21 5 The movement supplements
that vision with rules sensitive and responsive to the noneconomic
needs and expectations in exchanged promises. This picture loosens a
213. See supra note 182.
214. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3; Rakoff, supra note 19.
215. Eisenberg, supra note 3; Kennedy, supra note 5; Feinman, supra note 5.
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too rigid rules system geared to market transactions. It favors a rules
system prizing individual interests of parties, respecting their dignity
as persons in an imperfect world, honoring their liberty to participate
in unbalanced bargaining situations, requiring their responsibility for
broken promises, and recognizing the interdependence of parties and
the need for flexibility while tolerating uncertainty.
If contracts law is to be part of transformative efforts to improve
the whole of law, smaller segments of contracts law must be part of
the envisioned transformation. 216 These cases belie a more flexible
subjective world in which individual justice requires an inquiry into
the motives of parties and the nature of contractual relationships. So
conceived, the dynamic of law is a virtue promoting a fuller vision of
society and the aspirations of the individuals in that society.
216. Unger, supra note 5.

